SECTORAL FRAGMENTATION IN TRANSNATIONAL
CONTRACT LAW
Joshua Karton!
The transnational commercial law literature has long told a story in
which globalization yields ever-increasing legal harmonization. This Article
argues that it is a mistake to equate globalization with harmonization. Even
as the law of commercial relationships continues to globalize, it will split
along industry sector lines. National boundaries will matter less and
boundaries between industries will matter more, with one law for financial
services, another for oil and gas, another for software, and so on. Borrowing
a term and a conceptual framework from the public international law
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State governance declines in importance compared with private
governance, the borderless and sector-specific structure of commercial
communities is being recapitulated in formal contract law. This Article
describes the forces driving sectoral fragmentation and the specific legal
mechanisms through which it occurs. It concludes by exploring the
consequences of sectoral fragmentation for contract law and for the
regulation of cross-border commercial activity more generally.
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“r]q2*U,2p*O12pL . . . law . . . manifests a desire for unity and
universality, based on the common needs and interests of the international
economic community. As such, it does not accord with a fragmentation of
the international legal framework and encourages the use of unifying legal
notions, such as . . . general principles of law, or truly international public
.1LOWjd” 1
“r=qPU O2W,Up+O2Q O4.1,*p2WU 1R .p,*OW)Lp,O+4 O2 Lpmf U+.UWOpLLj O2
commercial law, comes from pressure exercised by merchants to have their
legal affairs treated by specialized experts.” 2
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INTRODUCTION

Much of the literature on transnational law indulges in a technocratic
utopianism, hailing the dawn of a new era of globally-harmonized, efficient
contract law that evolves at the speed of business. 3 Henceforth, we have
been promised, national borders will no longer be arbitrary speed bumps
along the forward path of international commerce. Implicit in this account
is the assumption that legal globalization means legal unification. But, in
reality, the future of contract law will be as fragmented as the past; it will
just be fragmented differently. This Article argues that a specific and
previously-unidentified type of legal differentiation is gaining momentum
within contract law: even as the law governing commercial contracts
increasingly harmonizes across territorial boundaries, it will increasingly
fragment along boundaries between industry sectors. In other words, the old
distinctions are indeed breaking down, but they are changing rather than
disappearing.
Adapting a term coined in the public international law context, I call
*PO+ .PU214U212 “+UW*1,pL R,pQ4U2*p*O12d” tO+*O2W*O12+ oU*mUU2 VORRU,U2*
kinds of contractual relationships (sales of goods, leases, franchises, joint
ventures, etc.) will matter less, as will the nationalities of the contracting
parties and the place(s) where the contract was formed and performed. The
industry context within which the contract is concluded will matter more. Or
to put it differently: what type of contract is implicated in a dispute will
gradually become less significant in determining the applicable rules, while
the subject matter of the contract will become more significant. In a
sectorally fragmented legal regime, contracts for the purchase of crude oil
by a refiner and for the purchase of office paper by the same refiner may
have identically written terms (mutatis mutandis), but will be interpreted
differently, will have different terms implied into them (including their
dispute resolution provisions), and will have different rules for determining
the remedies available and how damages are to be calculated.
Contracting practices have always varied from industry to industry, so
to the extent that private governance prevails over public governance, the
law will necessarily become differentiated along sectoral lines. The rise of
private, contractual governance, already documented in the legal and
political science literature, is part of the sectoral fragmentation picture. 4
3. Cf. Ralf Michaels, Dreaming law without a state: scholarship on autonomous
international arbitration as utopian literature, 1 LONDON REV. INT:L L. 35 (2013) (describing
the utopian character of much of the literature on international commercial arbitration).
4. See generally Peter Vincent-Jones, Contractual Governance: Institutional and
Organizational Analysis, 20 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 317 (2000) (exploring the role of contract as
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What is new is that the structures of private governance are now recapitulated
in formal contract law, including in laws promulgated by states. 5 Sectoral
fragmentation of law is thus evidence corroborating the proposition that the
balance of regulatory power has shifted from public to private governance,
and is also an example of the more subtle incorporation of private
perspectives into public governance. Public regulation of contracts is not
withering away, but state lawmaking processes are increasingly relegated to
validating, incorporating, and supplementing privately-generated standards.6
Scholars of transnational law have argued that the positive law is being
“+)RR1Wp*UV” O2 *PU U,p 1R QL1opLOiUV W144U,WUf p+ W144U,WOpL ,ULp*O12+PO.+
are increasingly conducted beyond the reach of national laws and courts. 7
This Article argues that no such suffocation is occurring; instead, in a reverse
of the traditional conception, formal contract law is being remade in the
shadow of private contracts. 8
Whatever onU:+ +WP1Lp,Lj 1, .1LO*OWpL pQU2Vpf O* O+ O4.1,*p2* *1
understand sectoral fragmentation. Most academic writing on transnational
law focuses on three issues: the nature of transnational law as law (its
legality), the sources of transnational law, and the processes by which
transnational laws are promulgated. 9 Largely missing from this theorizing is
the content of transnational legal rules, which is seldom considered outside
of studies of specific industries or supply chains. By identifying the
a governance mechanism).
5. Other areas of commercial law, such as those relating to property interests (including
secured transactions), remain more territorially bound; they are therefore less globalized and
less sectorally fragmented than contract law. This article deals only with transnational contract
law.
6. Gregory Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering 16–17 (U.C. Irvine Sch.
of L., Legal Stud. Research, Paper No. 2016-06, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2734318
[https://perma.cc/3CEE-C4QN].
7. See, e.g., Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Private Regulatory Governance:
Ambiguities of Public Authority and Private Power, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 122
(2013) (stating that “[o]ne view insists on emphasizing and lamenting the alleged weakness
of (the state:s) regulatory law that finds its most persuasive illustration in the triumphant
proliferation of private norm-setting and suggests that law cannot escape death by suffocation
in the oxygen-free atmosphere of globalization.”).
8. Credit for coining the memorable phrase that private agreements are made “in the
shadow of the law” belongs to Mnookin and Kornhauser. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950
(1979).
9. See generally Shaffer, supra note 6 (describing enforcement of rules by private and
public organizations). For example, Zumbansen states that the “deliverable” of his theoretical
approach “is to lay bare the processes through which views are being formulated, through
which they become dominant or defeated, institutionalized or squashed.” (emphasis added).
Zumbansen, supra note 7, at 134.
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phenomenon of sectoral fragmentation, this Article shows why what appears
to be a gap in the literature is actually a reflection of the changing structure
of contract law. There will not be any single, global set of rules that will
constitute transnational contract law. Instead, much of the law will be
structured as a set of distinct but overlapping parallel bodies of law, each
applicable to a different industry sector.
The phenomenon of sectoral fragmentation is a specific example of the
broader trend toward greater complexity and specialization in contract law.
Although it is impossible to predict the consequences of these developments
with certainty, there will inevitably be winners and losers. In general,
commercial parties prefer to be governed by specialized law applied by
specialists. Particularism in law increases efficiency by better aligning legal
outcomes with commercially reasonable ones; it permits parties to rely more
on standard terms and usages (and thereby reduce transaction costs on
individual contracts), while minimizing the risk that their intentions will be
misinterpreted ex post by a court or arbitral tribunal. 10 Different industry
sectors involve different types of contractual relationships and are subject to
different risk profiles; it would be surprising if a single set of rules for
contractual interpretation, say, or for damages calculation yielded efficient
results for all sectors. These benefits should not be underestimated.
But there are potential drawbacks as well. Complexity in law,
especially when doctrinally complex law is applied by diverse specialist
tribunals, inhibits the ability of public authorities to regulate commercial
activity. Sectoral fragmentation is also likely to privilege incumbent firms
by increasing the barriers to entry into an industry sector, which may create
harmful disincentives to innovation. The normative divisions that
10. Importantly, particularism need not be achieved through a proliferation of highly
specific, codified rules. This is the core insight behind the neoformalist movement in contract
law theory. The neoformalists argue that predictability and economic efficiency are best
served by a spare, formal approach in rulemaking, which emphasizes standards over rules and
therefore gives wide scope to trade usages. See, e.g., David Charny, The New Formalism in
Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842, 843 (1999) (stating that “[t]he current situation . . . calls for
reflection on the role of formalism in the current understanding in contract law.”); Robert E.
Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 847-48 (2000)
(reviewing the academic debate and describing and assessing “three alternative strategies for
interpreting relational contracts”); James G. Wilson, The Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 431, 461 (1985) (neoformalism “may eventually create a body of doctrine that is
slavishly and improperly followed.”); William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real
World of Forms, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 971 (2001) (considering how neoformalism in contracts
might operate in the real world); Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism (Stan. Pub. L. & Legal
Theory, Working Paper No. 4, (1999), http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=200732
[https://perma.cc/3FCV-WFAM] (explaining how an institutional conception of the rule of
law gives coherence and unity to different strands of the new formalism).
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accompany legal specialization contribute to a breakdown in common
standards as a general matter; this conceptual phenomenon, accompanying a
shift in the balance of power from public to private governance, threatens the
rule of law.
Sectoral fragmentation plays out as a theme running through various
phenomena related to globalization and the development of transnational
law. It is largely a self-sustaining phenomenon, and it may not be possible
for any group of policymakers to change its course. It is therefore all the
more important to come to grips with its trajectory. “A ,OWPU, )2VU,+*p2VO2Q
of transnational legal ordering facilitates both critique and reform.
Otherwise scholars are blind to how law operates, and they replicate that
blindness in their teaching, their scholarly work, and their normative
.,U+W,O.*O12+d” 11 In other words, there is no way back to a world without
globalization, so we had best set about understanding the world with it. 12
This Article explores the phenomenon of sectoral fragmentation: its
causes, its characteristics, and its consequences. Part II describes the concept
of fragmentation as developed in public international law, and argues for its
relevance to the evolution of private law. Part III sets out the four main
mechanisms or processes through which legal fragmentation has occurred in
the public international law context, and shows that these processes are all
operative in transnational contract law. Part IV argues that sectoral
fragmentation is an inevitable consequence of the rise of transnational
commercial communities as the key drivers of transnational legal rulemaking; it then explains how the mechanisms set out in Part III lead
specifically to sectoral fragmentation. Finally, Part V, the Conclusion,
briefly speculates as to the broader political and normative consequences of
a sectorally fragmented transnational contract law.
II.

THE CONCEPT OF LEGAL FRAGMENTATION

The concept of fragmentation was developed in the public international
law literature, and has been a preoccupation of that academic community for
more than a decade. The literature is large and continues to grow, but the
key document is a 2006 report published by the International Law
!144O++O12 h“*PU ]Z! ?U.1,*”gd13 The gist of the report is that public
11. Shaffer, supra note 6, at 21.
12. Peer Zumbansen, Law after the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism and the
Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law, 56(3) AM. J. COMP. L. 769, 770 (2008) (citing Martti
Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, 16 EUR. J. INT:L
L. 113 (2005)).
13. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification
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international law at one time constituted a more-or-less coherent and
systematic body of rules governing state interactions; then, as global civil
+1WOU*j oUWp4U VO(OVUV O2*1 +.UWOpLOiUV p2V p)*12141)+ “+.PU,U+ 1R +1WOpL
pW*O12f”14 international law lost its previous coherence and become
fragmented.
The ILC Report describes fragmentation as encompassing two related
phenomena: normative and institutional fragmentation.
Normative
fragmentation refers to the proliferation of distinct sub-fields within
international law, each somewhat autonomous from the others. These subfields both encompass a range of non-state actors previously not considered
subjects of international law, and apply to a wider range of conduct than
international law previously regulated. 15 Institutional fragmentation refers
to the proliferation of separate international and non-national rule-making
bodies, tribunals, and other institutions associated with these sub-fields; each
applies distinct bodies of rules and none has any power to overrule any of
the others.16
The ILC Report chose to consider only normative
fragmentation, 12 *PU Q,1)2V *Pp* “r*qPU O++)U 1R O2+*O*)*O1nal competencies
O+ oU+* VUpL* mO*P oj *PU O2+*O*)*O12+ *PU4+UL(U+d” 17 This choice met with
justified criticism. 18 Normative and institutional fragmentation can be
distinguished conceptually and do not necessarily occur in tandem, but they
cannot be separated in practice because both are driven by the same forces
and because they reinforce each other. 19 Normative fragmentation leads to
calls for specialized adjudicative bodies, yielding institutional
fragmentation. The divergent jurisprudence of these bodies and the divergent
perspectives of the specialist bars associated with them in turn generate
and Expansion of International Law, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, Int:l Law Comm:n,
Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006)
[hereinafter ILC Report].
14. Id. at 7.
15. Examples include the emergence of partly self-contained regimes of international
investment law, environmental law, trade law, and human rights law.
16. Examples include the arbitral tribunals that preside over investor-state disputes, the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the WTO Appellate Body and panels, the
various international criminal tribunals, and human rights tribunals like the European and
Inter-American Courts of Human Rights.
17. ILC Report, supra note 13, ¶13.
18. The reaction shows the public international law community:s continued dedication
to the “unity” and “universality” of international law. See, e.g., Christian Leathley, An
Institutional Hierarchy to Combat the Fragmentation of International Law: Has the ILC
Missed an Opportunity?, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT:L L. & POL. 259, 271-304 (2007) (explaining that
fragmentation undermines the reliability and credibility of international law).
19. See, e.g., Anne van Aaken, Fragmentation of International Law: The Case of
International Investment Protection, 17 FINNISH Y.B. INT:L L. 91, 93 (2006) (discussing the
structural factors that hinder the harmonious interpretation of international investment law).
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further normative fragmentation.
For many public international lawyers, fragmentation is cause for
W12WU,2f +O2WU O* *P,Up*U2+ *PU “)2O*jf” “)2O(U,+pLO*jf” “+j+*U4p*OWO*jf” p2V
“W1PU,U2WU” 1R O2*U,2p*O12pL Lpmd 20 Koskenniemi and Leino have called
)2Up+U 1(U, *PU L1++ 1R W1PU,U2WU O2 O2*U,2p*O12pL Lpm p “.1+*41VU,2
p2kOU*jf”21 bound up as it is with unease about the breakdown of traditional
normative orders in all aspects of society. 22 However, worries about
fragmentation are not merely the preoccupations of anxious postmodern
intellectuals T fragmentation really does have the potential to harm the
legitimacy of international law as a system of law:
The concern with fragmentation is not just a concern with our
intellectual ability (or inability) to conceptualize, systematize, or order the
law . . . . It is also a concern over political realities . . . . The intellectual
concern is that fragmentation can lead to the loss of a comprehensive
understanding. The political concern is that fragmentation can prompt the
decline of international law into technocratic and particularistic discourse. 23
To be sure, others are more sanguine. The opposing camp tends to see
fragmentation of international law as simply a function of greater specificity
of legal rules, itself a sign that international law is maturing. 24 For these
20. See, e.g., Tomer Broude, Fragmentation(s) of International Law: on Normative
Integration as Authority Allocation, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR RUTH LAPIDOTH 101-10, 104 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds.,
2008) (stating that “[a]uthority fragmentation . . . and norm fragmentation . . . are the warp
and weft of the complex fabric that is international law.”); Benedetto Conforti, Unité et
fragmentation du droit international: “glissez, mortels, n’appuyez pas!’, 111 REVUE
GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 5 (2007) (arguing that concerns over
fragmentation are overblown, and that fragmentation poses no significant risk to the
legitimacy of international law); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, A Doctrinal Debate in the
Globalisation Era: On the “Fragmentation” of International Law, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD.
(2007) (attempting to define the contours of the fragmentation of international law); Bruno
Simma, Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner, 20 EUR. J.
INT: L L. 265, 265 (2009) (describing “international rules, (particularly judicial) mechanisms,
and international institutions which serve the purpose of reconciling heterogeneous values
and expectations by means of international law”).
21. Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law?
Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEINDEN J. INT:L 553, 553-56 (2002); see also Gunther Teubner,
“De collisione discursuum: Communicative Rationalities in Law, Morality and Politics”, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 901, 901 (1996) (stating that fragmentation “haunts us”).
22. Annelise Riles, The Anti-network: Private Global Governance, Legal Knowledge,
and the Legitimacy of the State, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 605, 605 (2008).
23. Ralf Michaels, Private Lawyer in Disguise? On the Absence of Private Law and
Private International Law in Martti Koskenniemi’s Work, 27 TEMP. INT: L & COMP. L.J. 499,
511 (2013); see infra notes 200-203 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Georges Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding
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commentators, “*PO+ W14.LUkO*j O+ 2UWU++p,OLj p ,Up+12 R1, W14.LpO2*d
Simplicity is not per force a value in O*+ULRd”25 They ridicule the notion that
international law can be reduced to the collective content of a small set of
W1,U +1),WU+f LOMU2O2Q O* *1 *PU VUo)2MUV *PU1,j *Pp* “*PU Lpm W1)LV +O4.Lj
oU ,UV)WUV *1 mPp* *PU Xp*O12pL @p,LOp4U2* PpV U+*poLO+PUVd” 26 This school
of thought seems to adopt the reflexive or neo-functional conception of laws
as the self-referential products of social systems, and therefore as politically
neutral tools of technocratic management. 27 Since modern society is
complex and pluralistic, public international law too must be complex and
pluralistic.
=PU *U,4 “R,pQ4U2*p*O12” Pp+ 21* Wp)QP* 12 4)WP 1)*+OVU *PU .)oLOW
international law context. However, analogous debates have occurred with
respect to transnational private law. 28 To a large extent, the global private
law community shares the universalizing ethos of the public international
law community. As Smits notes, especially in civil law jurisdictions, “rRq1,
most scholars, the traditional picture is one in which private law is a
W1PU,U2*f )2O*p,jf p2V 2p*O12pL +j+*U4d”29 Systematicity and coherence have
historically been hailed as the great strengths of the civil codes, and the same
ideals have manifested in the transnational law sphere. There have been
strenuous efforts to make transnational law as coherent and unitary as
national laws were understood to be.
Admittedly, the fragmentation metaphor is an imperfect fit with the
phenomenon of sectoral fragmentation. While international law began from
a (possibly apocryphal) condition of unity and became more differentiated

Remarks, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT:L L. & POL. 919, 925 (1999) (stating that “the multiplication of
specialized tribunals is, by itself, a healthy phenomenon. . . . the term <proliferation:, with its
negative connotations, is misleading.”). A third group is sanguine for a different reason,
arguing that international law is re-converging. See, e.g., A FAREWELL TO FRAGMENTATION:
REASSERTION AND CONVERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL L AW (Mads Andenas & Eirik Bjorge,
eds., 2015) (containing various scholarly contributions exploring the re-convergence of
international law).
25. Sylvia Ferreri, General Report: Complexity of Transnational Sources, 1 EUR. REP.
PRIV. L. 3, 12 (2012).
26. Id. This “classical” notion of law has been in retreat since the beginning of the
twentieth century and has now been entirely retired from the field of intellectual battle.
27. Zumbansen, supra note 12, at 796. See Niklas Luhmann, Some Problems with
Reflexive Law, in STATE, LAW AND ECONOMY AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS 389 (Gunther
Teubner & Alberto Febbrajo eds., 1992) (critiquing this perspective as improperly (or at least
prematurely) deriving legality from broader values).
28. Michaels, supra note 23, at 501.
29. Jan Smits, Dutch Report: Coherence and Fragmentation of Private Law, 1 EUR. REV.
PRIV. L. 153, 155 (2012). This conception has always been less widely shared by common
law scholars than among civilians.
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over time,30 contract law has never experienced a globally unified legal order,
normative or institutional. Instead, since at least the Peace of Westphalia,
private law has been divided along state boundaries, and contract law
specifically has long been internally differentiated on a functional basis, with
different sets of rules for different kinds of transactional relationships. 31
Nevertheless, fragmentation is a useful lens through which view trends
in the development of private law. First, it helps to bring attention to
structural considerations. Law must be internally differentiated somehow or
else it cannot be conceptualized or consistently applied. Perhaps because of
its pervasiveness, the importance of how law is organized is often
underappreciated;32 it can inform assumptions and otherwise guide thinking
about individual legal problems in ways that are difficult for us to perceive
because they operate below the level of deliberate thought.
Second, thinking in terms of fragmentation reminds us that, although
the law must be subdivided somehow, when new divisions are introduced,
something is gained but something is also lost. It is worth paying attention
to the knock-on effects of reorganizations of the law even if, like with
sectoral fragmentation, the shifts are largely organic and self-propelled.
Third, and most important for present purposes, the public international
law literature on fragmentation provides a useful rubric for identifying the
mechanisms that contribute to or hinder fragmentation in law. The public
international law literature identifies four main processes by which
fragmentation occurs: proliferation of sources of legal rules, codification of
distinct legal sub-fields, incomplete or ineffective efforts at harmonization,
and proliferation of adjudicatory bodies. The first three collectively
constitute normative fragmentation, and the fourth represents institutional
fragmentation. As will be discussed below, these four processes of
normative and institutional fragmentation can all be observed in the context
of transnational contract law.
The academic and practitioner discourse on transnational commercial
law, especially contract law, continues to tell a story of harmonization and
unification, mostly as a by-product of the drive for greater efficiencies in
international commerce. 33 Indeed, much of the scholarly commentary on
30. That is, the International Court of Justice and, before it, the Permanent Court of
International Justice applied bodies of rules that were small in number, conceptually coherent,
and global in scope.
31. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
32. The one major exception is the role of characterization of legal rules in conflict of
laws, a highly contested and theoretically rich area.
33. See, e.g., Bryan H. Druzin, Anarchy, Order, and Trade: A Structuralist Account of
Why a Global Commercial Order is Emerging, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT:L L. 1049, 1053 (2014)
(arguing that “[t]he basic structure of trade drives toward convergence T a fact that may be
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globalization of contract law has a celebratory quality. 34 The current,
triumphant, state of transnational law represents the culmination of more
than a century of legal unification efforts. The numerous uniform law
projects, going back domestically at least to the foundation of the American
Law Institute in 1923, and internationally to the establishment of the Hague
!12RU,U2WU 12 @,O(p*U ]2*U,2p*O12pL Zpm O2 KEDIf “provide ample
evidence . . . that there has always been a substantial need for the
*,p2+2p*O12pLOip*O12 1R *PU LUQpL ,ULp*O12+PO.+ 1R O2*U,2p*O12pL W144U,WUd” 35
It is also easier to reach consensus on commercial regulation than in other
areas of law, because costs and benefits can be more clearly anticipated36 and
because the basic regulatory requirements of trade are the same
everywhere.37 Today, however, all areas of private law are increasingly
harmonized at the global level; contract law is exemplary only in that it began
globalizing earlier and has proceeded farther.
Nevertheless, modern contract law displays both normative and
institutional fragmentation, just as modern public international law does. In
domestic jurisdictions, contract law is no longer as systematic as it once
was,38 and transnational law is significantly more divided than national law. 39
The phenomenon of fragmentation has played out differently in the
transnational contract law context than it has in public international law, but
they are fundamentally the same phenomenon.
discerned as much on the macrolevel of state actors as it is on the microlevel of private
parties.”). Druzin does acknowledge that market-induced uniformity is not perfect and is
often overstated. Id. at 1076.
34. Zumbansen, supra note 12, at 770; see also Shaffer, supra note 6 (providing several
examples that showcase the benefits of transnational law).
35. KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA 34 (2d
ed. 2010).
36. Bryan H. Druzin, Anarchy, Order, and Trade: A Structuralist Account of Why a
Global Commercial Order is Emerging, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT:L L. 1049, 1087 (2014).
Druzin gives the example of European Union law, which began as a succession of commercial
agreements but now encompasses many areas of public and private regulation. Id. at 108788.
37. Id. at 1068.
38. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
737, 738–39 (2000) (arguing that “The scope of neoclassical law is residual and fragmented.
There is still a unitary body of contract principles (the rules of formation, validation,
performance, and remedies), but the law is residual in that it no longer attempts to encompass
all consensual transactions. Labor law and corporate law, for example, are no longer within
the scope of contract. The law also is fragmented, in that the unitary principles are not
necessarily applied in the same way in all types of cases. We have seen the recognition of
transaction typesTfor example, the law of sales is part of the general law of contract but
marked off for separate treatment.”).
39. See infra section III.B.
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=PU QL1opLOip*O12 o11+*U,+: 4O+*pMU O+ *1 equate globalization with
)2OROWp*O12d ]2 RpW*f *PU .PU214U212 1R “W12(U,QU2WU” W1).LUV mO*P
“O2R1,4UV VO(U,QU2WU” O+ p PpLL4p,M 1R 4p2j p,Up+ 1R QL1opLOip*O1240Twhat
_LU22 WpLL+ “+)+*pO2poLU VO(U,+O*j” p412Q VO+.p,p*U LUQpL *,pVO*O12+d 41 But
beyond this, globalization is not a unitary process. It occurs in different ways
at different speeds in different aspects of society. The typical picture of
transnational contract law as characterized by harmonization or unification
is therefore not incorrect per se, but it is incomplete. Overall harmonization
can coexist with sustained or even increased fragmentation in specific areas.
Indeed, multiple kinds of fragmentation can occur simultaneously and
overlap with each other; the term fragmentation is itself fragmented. In this
Article, I argue that territorial unification (i.e., globalization) and sectoral
fragmentation are driven by the same forces and therefore accompany each
other.
III.

FRAGMENTATION, PRIVATE GOVERNANCE, AND
TRANSNATIONAL LAW

The public international law literature identifies four mechanisms by
which legal fragmentation occurs: proliferation of sources of legal rules,
codification of distinct legal sub-fields, incomplete or ineffective
harmonization, and proliferation of adjudicatory bodies. Part III explains the
four mechanisms of fragmentation, illustrating each with examples from
transnational contract law. It shows that transnational contract law can fairly
be described as fragmented. In a sense, this is hardly surprising; contract law
was never a global unity, as public international law is purported to have
been. Nevertheless, it demonstrates the falsity of claims that economic
globalization and the legal unification movement have led to simplification
and unification of contract law. Part III also shows that, with respect to
transnational contract law, all four mechanisms of fragmentation can be
traced to the rise of private governance, and to the international commercial
Lpm W144)2O*j:+ ,U+.12+U *1 O2W,Up+O2Q W14.LUkO*jd 42 This discussion
40. These terms were coined and elucidated by Anne-Marie Slaughter; see ANNE-MARIE
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (giving a detailed account of global politics in
transformation).
41. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 378 (4th ed. 2010).
42. See generally THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
(Rodney Bruce Halland & Thomas J Biersteker eds., 2002) (arguing that, while states were
traditionally considered to be the only legitimate actors in international relations, this position
can no longer be maintained); TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS:
THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011) (explaining that the
internationalization and privatization of rulemaking has been motivated not only by the
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serves as background for the exploration of sectoral fragmentation in Part
IV.
A. Proliferation of Sources of Law
Starting in the mid-twentieth century but gaining in momentum ever
since, the sources of private law rules have proliferated in both number and
type. In addition to state and sub-state governments, there are now at least
four types of actors promulgating legal rules governing commercial
relationships: supranational governmental entities like the European Union,
technocratic non-governmental and inter-governmental bodies like United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT),
adjudicative bodies T both permanent like the WTO Appellate Body and ad
hoc like international arbitral tribunals T and private groups like NGOs and
trade associations.43
The result is that persons engaged in cross-border private legal
relationships T from those who have children with nationals of other states,
to travelers who vacation in foreign countries, to multinational corporations
T now find that those relationships are governed by a multitude of rules:
private and public, national and international, formal and informal. In the
commercial sphere, the most significant aspect of this broader phenomenon
is the rise of private contractual governance in transnational rulemaking. The
concept of contractual governance embodies the socio-legal insight that
contracts often regulate a wide range of behavior in ways that are distinct
from their legally binding character, 44 and that contracts themselves therefore
take on the character of governance, especially where common sets of
standard terms are shared across members of a commercial network. 45
economic benefits of common rules for global markets, but also by the realization that
government regulators often lack the expertise and resources to deal with increasingly
complex and urgent regulatory tasks).
43. Roger Cotterrell, What is Transnational Law?, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 500, 518
(2012) (stating that “[m]uch transnational regulation and policy formation now develops
through the work of innumerable associations, organizations, or corporate bodies engaged in
setting and developing standards.”). See generally Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The
Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 149, 157 (1997) (detailing
the rise of private rule-makers in transnational law).
44. The ur-text of this field of contracts scholarship is Stewart Macaulay, NonContractual Relations and Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963). See
HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (1999) (providing a comprehensive theory of
contract working from this perspective).
45. See, e.g., Vincent-Jones, supra note 4 (exploring the role of contract as a governance
mechanism).
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The proliferation of sources in itself leads to fragmentation, but the
larger factor is that these different sources of governance partially overlap
and scarcely coordinate with each other. Different aspects of private law
“p,U VUpL* mO*P oj VORRU,U2* <LpmQO(U,+: mO*P1)* p2 1(U,pLL ,U+.12+OoOLO*j R1,
coherence and unity in the hands of one overarching institution. This has led
*1 VO(U,QO2Q +)o+*p2*O(U 21,4+f pLL mO*P p2 U-)pL WLpO4 *1 (pLOVO*jd” 46 In the
.1LO*OWpL +WOU2WU LO*U,p*),Uf *PO+ .PU214U212 O+ ,URU,,UV *1 p+ “4)L*OLU(UL
Q1(U,2p2WU”f p2V O+ p++1WOp*UV mO*P *PU o,UpMV1m2 1R *,pVO*O12pL +*p*Ucentric conceptions of the international order.47
Aside from the organs of the European UnionTthemselves under
pressure from Brexit and divisions among member statesTdynamism in
transnational rulemaking increasingly lies with private entities operating as
transnational regulatory networks: industry associations, individual parties
engaged in contracting, committees of experts, and NGOs and IGOs like the
Hague Conference on Private International Law and the International
Chamber of Commerce. 48 In other words, within the multilevel system of
governance that predominates in international private law, non-state actors
are increasingly prominent. 49 Thus far, rules generated through private
governance processes have served largely to fill gaps in public governance,
but now private governance has moved beyond gap-filling and is dominating
more broadly. Industry associations have been particularly active in
international rulemaking, both in promulgating rules themselves and in
shaping the development of treaties and other international instruments.50
46. Smits, supra note 29, at 166.
47. Gary Marks et al., Competencies, Cracks and Conflicts: Regional Mobilisation in the
European Union, 29 COMP. POLIT. STUD. 164, 167 (1996) (defining multilevel governance as
“overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governments and the interaction of
political actors across those levels.”).
48. See Stavros Gadinis, Three Pathways to Global Standards: Private, Regulator, and
Ministry Networks, 109(1) AM. J. INT: L L. 1, 6-9 (2015) (identifying three sources of global
standards: states, private industry groups, and NGOs).
49. BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 42; Riles, supra note 22.
50. See, e.g., Melissa J. Durkee, Astroturf Activism, 69 STAN. L. REV. 201 (2017)
(detailing various ways that corporations disguise their lobbying through use of “astroturf”
nonprofit associations); Melissa J. Durkee, The Business of Treaties, 63 UCLA L. REV. 264
(2016) (describing the role of business actors in treaty drafting generally); Sarah Dadush, The
Internal Challenges of Associational Governance, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 125 (2017)
(describing the normative dynamics within industry associations that affect their capacity to
act as governance mechanisms); Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability,
89 WASH. L. REV. 747, 753–56 (2014) (noting that corporations are increasingly responsible
for regulating throughout their “global value chains”); Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and
Public Governance Beyond the State: The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability
Board, and the Global Governance Order, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD 751, 762–72 (2011)
(stating that businesses self-regulate through regulatory arbitrage and through creating rules
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The rise of private governance is partly due to a stagnation in formal
international rulemaking51 and partly due to an active or passive delegation
of regulatory power by states to supranational and private organizations. 52 In
many quarters, this delegation is motivated by a neoliberal belief in “+*p*U
O2+*O*)*O12+: O2W14.U*U2WU *1 .,1.U,Lj 1,VU, +1WOU*j” p2V p W1,,U+.12VO2Q
RpO*P O2 “+1WOU*j:+ -)p+O-natural powers to self-,UQ)Lp*U O*+ pRRpO,+”d53
Skepticism about the need for and effectiveness of public regulation of
private relationships is most prevalent with respect to commercial
transactions.54 In line with the libertarian (or at least neoliberal) ethos that
pervades much of this literature, Druzin argues that market reciprocity, while
p2 O4.U,RUW* U2R1,WU4U2* 4UWPp2O+4f “O+ +)RROWOU2* *1 +)+*pO2 LUQpL 1,VU,
where central enforcement mechanisms are lacking, which is largely the case
O2 *PU O2*U,2p*O12pL W12*Uk*d”55 =PU ).+P1* O+ *Pp* “rpq +.pWU Pp+ oUU2 W,Up*UVf
outside the normative reach of municipal authorities and international
agencies established by treaties or conventions, for new agencies to elaborate
the emerging ratio 1R *,p2+2p*O12pL Lpmd”56
This does not mean, however, that transnational law is entirely
autonomous from state law and state courts. At minimum, transnational law,
regardless of its origin, depends on states for enforcement.57 But even before
disputes arise and judgments must be enforced, transnational law is

for their supply chains); Mark J. Sundahl, The “Cape Town Approach”: A New Method of
Making International Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT:L. L. 339, 341, 344 (2006) (describing
the role of commercial parties, specifically airplane manufacturers, in guiding the drafting and
driving the adoption of the 2001 Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment).
51. Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters, When Structures Become
Shackles: Stagnation and Dynamics in International Lawmaking, 25(3) E UR. J. INT:L L. 733,
734-38 (2014). Pauwelyn et al. identify three reasons for this slowdown: “saturation” such
that treaties already exist in many areas, “backlash” to treaty-making after the wave of new
treaties in the 1990s, and the financial crisis, which has made American and European
leadership more preoccupied with domestic problems and cautious about entering into new
international obligations and structures. Id. at 738-44.
52. Shaffer, supra note 6, at 9.
53. Zumbansen, supra note 12, at 799.
54. Id. at 803.
55. Druzin, supra note 36, at 1058.
56. Cotterrell, supra note 43, at 517.
57. See Lawrence Friedman, Erewhon: The Coming Global Legal Order, 37 STAN. J.
INT: L L. 347, 356–7 (2001) (arguing that sets of contractual provisions with quasi-statutory
effect, like the Hague-Visby Rules and the UCP, do not on their own constitute autonomous
norms created within the international economy, since “all such customs and practices have
to be validated somehow by national courts applying what they consider to be national law or
rules that national law recognizesTor, as is often the case, the law that the parties to a contract
may have stipulated”).
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strengthened when it is transposed into national laws. 58 As Michaels
observes, states may directly incorporate transnational law into their
domestic systems by ratifying a convention or enacting legislation based on
an international model law, may treat transnational laws as facts in domestic
litigation (such as when international commercial norms are treated as trade
usage or customary law), and may permit private parties to choose to be
governed by transnational law over national law (by enforcing arbitral
awards applying transnational law). 59 Whichever way transnational rules
U2*U, 2p*O12pL Lpmf O* O+ +*p*U+: pV1.*O12 1, pWWU.*p2WU 1R *,p2+2p*O12pL ,)LU+
that confers legal validity (in the positivist sense) upon them. 60 At the same
time, these processes import the greater fragmentation of the transnational
space into domestic legal systems, ratifying and reinforcing the multilevel
character of transnational rulemaking.
B. Codification of Distinct Legal Sub-Fields
The second mechanism of fragmentation identified in the literature
arises from the promulgation of increasing numbers of codifications, each
pertaining to different kinds of private relationships. These often overlap,
but also leave aspects of private relationships ungoverned by any
transnational rules. 61 As a result, similar relationships may be governed by
national rules, transnational rules, or some awkward combination of the two.
Moreover, these codifications may be adopted or accepted by some states
and not others, increasing fragmentation along state boundaries beyond the
level that existed before the codification was introduced. 62
58. Even in areas dominated by private contractual governance, the state continues to
play an important role. See, e.g., Tehila Sagy, What’s so Private About Private Ordering?,
45 L AW & SOC:Y REV. 923 (2011) (discussing three well-known cases of private ordering by
market communities).
59. Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEG. STUD. 447, 461 (2007).
60. Cotterrell, supra note 43, at 520; see also Michaels, supra note 59, at 465 (stating
that “[h]owever, the law that we find is not truly autonomous from the state in any meaningful
sense. Rather, we observe a continuous competition and interplay between state and non-state
institutions.”).
61. José Angelo Estrella Feria, The Relationship Between Formulating Agencies in
International Legal Harmonization: Competition, Cooperation, or Peaceful Coexistence?, 51
LOYOLA L. REV. 253, 272 (2005) (stating that “duplications or even contradictions T real or
potential T persist, and sometimes the compromise to avoid them is translated in a complex
(some might even say <artificial:) delimitation of the respective field of application of the
various instruments being prepared by each organization in question.”).
62. Smits, supra note 29, at 156. For example, in the United States, the reception of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and the Restatement (2d) of Contracts have differed
remarkably. The U.C.C. or nearly all of it has been adopted by every state, while the uptake
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The piecemeal way in which transnational rules have been enacted
creates a fragmentation of its own, with different aspects of the same legal
relationship potentially governed by multiple national and international laws.
As a result, the work of uniform law bodies like UNCITRAL and the Hague
Conference on Private International Lpm “Pp+ 21* oUU2 ,Ump,VUV oj *,)U
simplification: in reality the many efforts by numerous players have
.,1V)WUV *PU .p,pV1k 1R p2 O2W,Up+U O2 *PU 2)4oU, 1R O2+*,)4U2*+d” 63 The
“W,UU.O2Q W1VOROWp*O12” 1R *,p2+2p*O12pL .,O(p*U Lpm 64 has in practice led to
the same kind of systemic incoherence in domestic law that scholars have
decried with respect to fragmentation of international law. 65
C. Fragmentation Through Incomplete or Ineffective Harmonization
of Law
Laws that have been formally harmonized may fragment (or remain
fragmented) when states make reservations to them66 or enact different
versions of them,67 or when state courts apply different language versions of
them68 or apply them in disparate ways in line with their own distinct national
of the Restatement has been far more uneven. David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO
ST. L.J. 371, 378-84 (2003).
63. Ferreri, supra note 25, at 14. Private law within national systems has also fragmented
in this way, with codifications of distinct aspects of domestic law, but domestic laws benefit
from relatively unified mechanisms for rule-making, rule-implementing, and rule-enforcing.
See, e.g., Mel Kenny, Globalization, Interlegality and Europeanized Contract Law, 21 PENN
ST. INT:L L. REV. 569, 570 (2003) (stating that “[f]urther exacerbating fragmentation . . . a
feature of recent national law-making in Civil law jurisdictions has been the passing of
increasingly specific laws, especially in consumer protection, outside the general codified law
of contract.”); Lucie Cheng & Arthur Rosett, Contract with a Chinese Face: Socially
Embedded Factors in the Transformation from Hierarchy to Market, 5 J. CHINESE L. 143
(1991) (describing the “fragmentation” of Chinese contract law into distinct codes and statutes
for distinct types of contractual relationships T between individuals, between agricultural
collectives and farmers, and between units of socialist production T and then the further
fragmentation of the law of commercial contracts into rules regulating purely domestic
transactions and those regulating transactions with a foreign element).
64. BERGER, supra note 35.
65. Sandeep Gopalan, New Trends in the Making of International Commercial Law, 23
J.L. & COM. 117, 133 (2004).
66. CISG-AC Declaration No. 2, “Use of Reservations under the CISG”. Rapporteur:
Professor Dr. Ulrich G. Schroeter. Adopted by the CISG-AC following its 18th meeting, in
Beijing, China, on 21 October 2013, available at https://www.cisgac.com/cisgac-declarationno2/ [https://perma.cc/73H6-DJFB].
67. Gopalan, supra note 65, at 128.
68. See, e.g., Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized
System, 17 J.L. & COM. 187 (1998) (arguing that the adoption of uniform international rules
with multiple language versions can contribute to inconsistent interpretations of international
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laws and traditions. This last phenomenon, often referred to as the
“P14Ump,V *,U2Vf” O+ *PU +)o*LU+* o)* pL+1 *PU 41+* VORROW)L* *1 ,U4UVjd 69 As
`U,,U,O m,jLj 1o+U,(U+f “rOq2 +14U N)VOWOpL +U**O2Q+f p WU,*pO2 W12*,pVOW*O12
Wp2 oU VU*UW*UV oU*mUU2 LO. +U,(OWU .pOV *1 *PU <U2,OWP4U2*: VU,O(O2Q R,14
legal pluralism and actual judicial practice that sometimes simply ignores
complexity by leaving aside solutions deriving from the international source
,)LU+ *Pp* 1)QP* oU p..LOUVd”70
This problem arises with all efforts to establish internationally uniform
laws. However, it is felt particularly keenly within the EU. The literature
on European integration is rife with concerns that harmonization of some
areas of law but not others, and divergent application of EU laws by national
courts, will leave Community law fragmented. 71 The European Commission
O*+ULR O2(1MUV *PO+ W12WU,2 O2 O*+ “AW*O12 @Lp2” R1, “A Y1,U !1PU,U2*
a),1.Up2 !12*,pW* Zpmf” m,O*O2Q *Pp* 12U 1R *PU Q1pL+ 1R !144)2O*j Lpm O+
*1 “avoid conflicting results and . . . define abstract legal terms in a
consistent manner allowing the use of the same abstract term with the same
meaning for the purposes of several directives. As such, it should indirectly
remedy the fragmentation of national contract laws and promote their
co2+O+*U2* p..LOWp*O12d” 72

laws).
69. JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL
SALES 1 (1989); see also Larry DiMatteo et al., The Interpretive Turn in International Sales
Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT:L L & BUS. 299, 43739 (2004) (describing the “persistence of homeward trend”).
70. Ferreri, supra note 25, at 15.
71. See, e.g., Matthias Storme, The Foundations of Private Law in a Multilevel Structure:
Balancing, Distribution of Lawmaking Power, and Other Constitutional Issues, 1 EUR. R.
PRIV. L. 237, 244 (2012) (stating that “distribution of powers can lead to more or less
homogeneous or to very fragmented domains of jurisdiction.”); Nicole Stolowy & Severine
Schrameck, The Contribution of European Law to National Legislation Governing Business
Law, 2011,6 J. BUS. L. 614, 626-27 (2011) (expressing concerns over a lack of consistent
application of European laws and regulations by national courts of EU member states); Ugo
Mattei & Fernanda Nicola, A ‘Social Dimension’ in European Private Law? The Call for
Setting A Progressive Agenda, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 12 (2006) (stating that “the nonuniform implementation of directives by Member States leads to inconsistencies and
fragmentation of contract regimes, creating different legal rules for the same commercial
situation.”); Dominik Kallweit, Towards a European Contract Law: For a Prosperous Future
of International Trade, 35 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 269, 280 (2004) (stating that “a
large body of Community legislation regarding contract law is already in place. It is
commonly accepted that this legislation is fragmented and partly inconsistent.”).
72. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to
the European Parliament and the Council, A More Coherent European Contract Law: An
Action Plan 15 (2003), available at https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail//publication/9cf842b8-a9a1-4407-b791-312435c014c6 [https://perma.cc/W9NU-PT2H].
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D. Proliferation of Adjudicative Bodies
The complexity generated by these forces in turn generates calls for
greater technical expertise (and concomitantly greater specialization) in
regulatory and adjudicative bodies. In particular, national courts are often
criticized as incompetent to handle complex cross-border disputes and keep
up with fast-moving developments in international commerce. 73 One
response has been the establishment of specialist business courts of various
kinds. In most cases, such courts only have jurisdiction over a dispute
oUWp)+U *PU .p,*OU+: W12*,pW* O2WL)VU+ p2 Uk.,U++ WP1OWU 1R *PU R1,)4d =1
this extent, even national courts rule by virtue of party autonomy rather than
state power. Prominent examples include the Chancery Court of Delaware,
the Technology and Construction Court in London (a subdivision of the High
Court of Justice of England and Wales), and the Singapore International
Commercial Court.
The rationales given for many specialist courts show that they are
motivated by an ethos that prefers private ordering to state intervention, and
which sees the role of law and the state as limited to the facilitation of
individual autonomy. 74 For example, the website of the Singapore
International Commercial Court states that it was established in order to offer
LO*OQp2*+ “*PU 1.*O12 1R Pp(O2Q *PUO, VO+.)*U+ pVN)VOWp*UV oj p .p2UL 1R
experienced . . d +.UWOpLO+* W144U,WOpL N)VQU+f” p2V *Pp* “O* +UUM+ *1 .,1(OVU
parties in transnational business with one more option among a suite of
(OpoLU pL*U,2p*O(U+ *1 ,U+1L(U *,p2+2p*O12pL W144U,WOpL VO+.)*U+d” 75
Specialist courts therefore have both the institutional capacity and an
O2WU2*O(U *1 +*pj mO*PO2 *PU “o1)2Vp,OU+” 1R *PU .p,*OW)Lp, VO+.)*U+ *Pp* p,U
brought before them, but less institutional capacity or incentive to reassert
universal norms or keep watch over the conceptual coherence or
systematicity of the law. This is not to say that specialist courts never reach
beyond the confines of their associated bodies of law to vindicate more
broadly-applicable principles; however, they are likely to do so strategically,
rather than as a general policy or in the service of maintaining overall
coherence.76
73. ALAN REDFERN ET AL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 26 (4th ed. 2004) (arguing that courts are “unaccustomed to international
commercial transactions and . . . [their] laws and practices are not adequate to deal with
them.”).
74. Zumbansen, supra note 12, at 774.
75. Establishment of the SICC, SINGAPORE INT:L COMM. CT., https://www.sicc.gov.sg/
about-the-sicc [https://perma.cc/GQ7J-59Z5].
76. On the role of specialist adjudicative bodies, especially arbitral tribunals, in
promoting sectoral fragmentation, see infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. On the
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Many commercial parties exercise their autonomy to opt out of court
systems altogether and, instead, to resolve disputes by arbitration or some
other form of alternative dispute resolution. The popularity of arbitration is
often overblown,77 but it undoubtedly plays a prominent role in the resolution
of cross-border commercial disputes, especially in certain industry sectors
(such as construction and energy).78
Arbitral tribunals are likely to abet fragmentation even more than
specialist national courts. The arbitral system places a high priority on party
autonomy as a matter of social norms, not just rules. 79 Parties opting for
arbitration have almost total freedom to choose the substantive and
procedural rules that will govern their dispute, as well as the arbitrators who
will apply those rules.
Even when the same rules apply in arbitration that would apply in
national courts, use of arbitration is likely to lead to greater fragmentation
because arbitral decision-making systematically diverges from judicial
decision-making. A small but growing body of literature has shown that,
V)U *1 *PU O2*U,2p*O12pL p,oO*,p*O12 ROULV:+ VO+*O2W* .,1RU++O12pL W)L*),Uf 80 its
systemic biases,81 p,oO*,p*1,+: UW1214OW p2V 1*PU, O2WU2*O(U+f 82 the social
drawbacks to specialist tribunals, in particular the risk of tunnel vision and industry capture,
see infra notes 217-222 and accompanying text.
77. Thomas Dietz, Does International Commercial Arbitration Provide Efficient
Contract Enforcement Institutions for International Trade?, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: CONTENDING THEORIES AND EVIDENCE (Walter Mattli & Thomas
Dietz, eds., 2014); Michael McIlwrath & Ronald Schroeder, The View from and International
Arbitration Customer: In Dire Need of Early Resolution, 74(1) ARBITRATION 3 (2008);
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study
of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 52(2) DEPAUL
L. REV. 335 (2006-2007).
78. As indicated by Corporate choices in International Arbitration: Industry
Perspectives, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 7, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/arbitration-dispute
-resolution/assets/pwc-international-arbitration-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NJH-QALX].
To the extent that arbitrators and judges apply the governing laws in a divergent manner, a
disparity between industries in the use of dispute resolution methods itself contributes to
sectoral fragmentation. As will be discussed in this section, there is reason to believe that
arbitrators and judges have distinct perspectives that may lead them to apply the same laws
differently.
79. JOSHUA KARTON, THE CULTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OF CONTRACT LAW 78 (2013).
80. Id.
81. Stavros Brekoulakis, Systemic Bias and the Institution of International Arbitration,
4(3) J. INT:L. DISP. SETTLEMENT 1 (2013).
82. Thomas Schultz, Arbitral Decision-Making: Legal Realism and Law & Economics,
6(2) J. INT:L. DISP. SETTLEMENT 231 (2015); Thomas Schultz & Robert Kovacs, The Rise of
a Third Generation of Arbitrators? & Fifteen Years After Dezalay and Garth, 28(2) ARB. INT:L
161, 165-68 (2012).
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structure of the profession, 83 and the collegial dynamics of arbitral
tribunals,84 arbitrators are likely to reach different decisions than national
courts, even when applying the same law. The lack of any appellate
hierarchy within international commercial arbitration, and the very limited
basis on which national courts may overturn or refuse to enforce an award,
mean that few opportunities exist to counteract these tendencies. 85 Thus,
specialized adjudication, itself a product of legal fragmentation, leads to
greater fragmentation.
IV.

SECTORAL FRAGMENTATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACT
LAW

As Part III has shown, the existing literature amply describes the how
of private law fragmentation. However, it has done little to illuminate the
what. Commentators speak in terms of decreasing systematicity or
coherence and increasing complexity. But the question remains: what will a
fragmented contract law actually look like? In what specific ways will it be
less systematic or more complex? What will be the content of the new and
newly-globalized rules of law? Part IV provides a partial answer to these
questions: transnational contract law is fragmenting into different bodies of
rules for different industry sectors.
Since before there was legal enforcement of commercial contracts, 86
merchants in different industries have developed their own conventions and
standard terms. Thus, to the extent that governance is shaped by private
contract, it has long varied from industry to industry. Traditionally,
however, courts analyzed all different types of transactions under the broad
,)o,OW 1R “W12*,pW* Lpmd” There are notable exceptions, such as the laws that
govern divorce agreements, employment contracts, and consumer contracts.
However, these tend to arise with respect to relationships that society deems
worthy of close regulation, either because they relate to important social
norms (as in family law) or because of the potential for abuse of a dominant
position (as in consumer and employment law). Under national legal
83. Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25(2) EUR. J. INT:L L. 387
(2014).
84. Todd Tucker, Inside the Black Box: Collegial Patterns on Investment Tribunals, 7(1)
J. INT:L. DISP. SETTLEMENT 183 (2016).
85. KARTON, supra note 79, at 236-237.
86. In the common law, at least since actions for assumpsit and wholly executory bilateral
contracts were recognized, beginning with Slade’s Case (1602) 4 Co. Rep. 92b, (1602) 76 ER
1074. See JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 333-34 (4th ed.
2002) (discovering writs of assumpsit from as early as 1360). Previously, the only available
action for breach of a commercial agreement was for recovery of a money debt. Id. at 329.
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systems, most agreements between commercial parties continue to be
addressed by courts under broadly-applicable rules of contract law, although
precedents dealing with similar categories of contracts are more analogous
and therefore more likely to constitute binding precedents (in a common law
system) or make up a jurisprudence constante.87
Now, however, even as contract law is unifying across national
boundaries, it is fragmenting across sectoral boundaries. The sectorally
fragmented character of private contracts is being recapitulated in public
governance.
Sectoral fragmentation occurs whenever rulemaking entities (whether
private or public, national or international, formal or informal, regulatory or
legislative or adjudicative) adopt legal rules that yield different outcomes on
analogous transactions in different industry sectors. I label such rules
“O2V)+*,j-.p,*OW)Lp,O+*f”88 mPOLU “QU2U,pLO+*” ,)LU+ p..Lj *1 12U 1, 41,U
categories of transactions across all areas of commerce.
To clarify, sectoral fragmentation is distinct from the notion that
different rules may apply to different types of transactions T what one might
call functional differentiation within contract law. Although a lease of
commercial real estate and a sale of goods between merchants are both
contracts, and both involve a transfer of property interests in return for
money, they describe different commercial relationships with distinct
purposes and characteristics. It would be unremarkable for them to be
governed by different rules and contain different sets of implied terms. For
example, a commercial lease might be subject to an implied term
guaranteeing a right of re-entry for the lessor under specified circumstances,
a term that would make little sense in a sale of goods contract; similarly, the
relational character of a lease and the one-off character of a lump-sum sale
might call for different rules of interpretation. 89 Functional fragmentation
yields different bodies of rules depending on which kinds of interests are
conferred under the transaction, while sectoral fragmentation yields different

87. Jurisprudence constante is a form of precedent in French law, according to which
legal doctrines may emerge by accretion from a consistent line of cases, rather than from a
single judgment. French law thus achieves “unification and stability of judicial activity”
similar to that prevailing in common law jurisdictions without a doctrine of stare decisis or
of judge-made law generally. Michel Troper & Christophe Grzegorczyk, Precedent in
France, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS 103, 137 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers,
eds., 1997).
88. Van Howeling uses the word “atomism” to describe roughly the same concept. Molly
Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA L. REV.
549 (2010).
89. See Scott, supra note 10 (highlighting the benefits of formalism in contract law).
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bodies of rules depending on who confers and receives those interests. 90
Contract law has long been internally subdivided on a functional basis.
In civil law jurisdictions, civil and commercial codes and codes of
obligations typically categorize contracts in this way, and establish distinct
sets of mandatory and derogable rules for each type of transaction.
Identifying the functional category of the contract is therefore the first step
in contract litigation in civilian systems. 91 Although common law
jurisdictions have not engaged in such efforts to systematically categorize
contracts via legislation (with the important exception of the United States
in the form of Uniform Commercial Code), common law doctrines and
statutory regimes that deal with subsets of contract law also tend to define
their scope of application according to the function of the transaction
involved.92 Transnational rulemaking activities have also proceeded on the
basis of establishing sets of rules for particular categories of transactions. 93
The kind of particularism considered here T the industry-centric
particularism that is related to sectoral fragmentation T describes something
different. It would mean, for example, that a contract for the sale of crude
oil from a producer to a refiner and a contract for the sale of office paper
from a manufacturer to the same refiner are governed by distinct bodies of
legal rules, even though they both constitute cross-border sales of goods
between commercial entities, because one sale involves oil and the other
involves stationery. Industry-particularism is the micro-level doctrinal
expression of the macro-level phenomenon of sectoral fragmentation;
fragmentation is to governance as particularism is to rules.
This Part describes the ways that the four modes of fragmentation
described above in Part III play out in the transnational commercial context,
in particular how contractual governance drives the increasing prominence
of industry-particularist rules of contract law. It is divided into two sections.
The first argues that commercial networks will tend to drive sectoral

90. Note that consumer protection law is excluded from the analysis here, although it is
a potentially important part of the overall picture; this article deals only with relationships
between commercial parties.
91. See, e.g., BARRY NICHOLAS, THE FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 47 (2nd ed. 1992)
(stating that the first step taken by French courts during contract litigation is to characterize
the contracts).
92. The most obvious example is the U.C.C., which is organized on exactly this basis:
Article 2 deals with sales, Article 2A with leases, Article 3 with transfers of negotiable
instruments, and so on.
93. Examples include three UN Conventions originally promulgated by UNCITRAL: the
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the Convention on the
Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, and the Convention on Contracts for the
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea.
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fragmentation because they benefit from the development of globallyharmonized, industry-particularist bodies of substantive law. Accordingly,
legal orders dominated by private governance, in particular transnational
contract law, are likely to become sectorally fragmented. The second section
describes the primary mechanisms by which private governance generates
industry-particularist rules: industry-particularism can arise from the
promulgation of rules that apply only to one industry sector across multiple
classes of transactions, from the application of flexible rules that yield
different outcomes depending on the commercial context of the contract at
issue, from the application of different national laws in different industries,
and from the use of specialized adjudication, especially arbitration.
A. Private Governance and Fragmented Contract Law
Business enterprises operating in the same sector, regardless of their
nationality, often have more in common with each other than they do with
other enterprises from the same state. Businesses in the same sector deal
with similar types of technical problems (and therefore develop common
technical expertise), are subject to similar risks and economic pressures, and
contract repeatedly with each other or with the same suppliers or customers.
In other words, the modern global economic system is less geographically
differentiated and more sectorally differentiated. The only question is
whether contract law wiLL pL+1 “+POR* . . . from a state-based structure to an
economy-op+UV +*,)W*),Ud” 94
The prevailing approach in transnational law scholarship sees
differentiation in law as a reflection of the differentiation of global society
T different social groups operate relatively autonomously from each other,
and therefore exhibit distinct senses of what kinds of conduct are acceptable.
Roughly the same argument can be put in various ways. In legal scholarship,
this view is most associated with Teubner, 95 who writes *Pp* “rOq2*U,2pL
94. Michaels, supra note 59, at 465. He continues:
“As long as commercial law reflects the political system, it remains state law because the
internal differentiation within the political system concerns the boundaries between states. If,
by contrast, commercial law reflects the economic system, then it concerns both state and
non-state norms and institutions because the internal differentiation of the economy concerns
not the boundaries between state and non-state, but rather the boundaries between different
sectors of the economy.” Id. Note that Michaels:s concern is with the source of the rules; by
contrast, I am concerned with the scope of application of the rules. For present purposes,
what matters is whether a given body of rules is particularist or generalist and, if particularist,
how it defines the scope of relationships to which it applies; it does not matter whether the
rules derive from state or non-state sources.
95. See, e.g., GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL
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differentiation of law can be seen as a response to the fragmentation of
+1WOU*j O2 (p,O1)+ +j+*U4+ p2V VO+W1),+U+d” 96 Similarly, Cotterrell describes
“2U*m1,M+ 1R W144)2O*j” p+ *PU L1WO 1R *,p2+2p*O12pL ,)LU-making.97 Such
2U*m1,M+ p,U VURO2UV 1oNUW*O(ULj oj “+*poLU +)+*pO2UV O2*U,pW*O12+” oU*mUU2
4U4oU,+ 1R *PU W144)2O*j p2V +)oNUW*O(ULj oj p “+U2+U 1R p**pWP4U2*”
among community members.98 =PU+U LUpV *1 *PU VU(UL1.4U2* 1R “mUor+q 1R
rW14412q )2VU,+*p2VO2Qrq” *Pp* Wp2f 1(U, *O4Uf QpO2 *PU R1,WU 1R Lpmd 99
Outside the legal academy, Sassen100 argues that national, international,
and transnational (including private) processes of institutional and normative
formation are dynamically related to each other, forming multiple and
1(U,Lp..O2Q “QL1opL p++U4oLpQU+” 4pVU .1++OoLU oj 41VU,2 O2R1,4p*O12
technology.101 These assemblages constitute distinct social spheres that
integrate territorial and de-territorial, vertical and horizontal, private and
public ordering processes. 102 In the constructivist international relations
LO*U,p*),Uf AVLU, VU+W,OoU+ “W144)2O*OU+ 1R .,pW*OWUf” 103 mPOWP “W12+O+* 1R
people who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest
O2 LUp,2O2Q p2V p..LjO2Q p W14412 .,pW*OWUd” 104 Such a common practice,
“O2 *),2f rO+q +)+*pO2UV oj p repertoire of communal resources, such as
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION 162-66 (Gareth Norbury trans., Oxford Univ. Press
2012) (noting an instance of fragmentation of transnational law in intellectual property
regulation); Gunther Teubner & Peter Korth, Two Kinds of Legal Pluralism: Collision of
Transnational Regimes in the Double Fragmentation of World Society, in REGIME
INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING FRAGMENTATION 23-25 (Margaret A. Young
ed., 2012) (highlighting the development of an international conflict of laws doctrine in
response to a change in technology); Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, RegimeCollisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH.
J. INT:L L. 999 (2004) (explaining Teubner:s theory of intersystemic conflict of laws and how
it supports a shift away normative-based laws).
96. Teubner, supra note 21, at 916.
97. See generally ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW, CULTURE AND SOCIETY; LEGAL IDEAS IN THE
MIRROR OF SOCIAL THEORY 68-73 (2006) (discussing the emergence of communities, in
particular the factors that lead them to coalesce); Roger Cotterrell, Transnational Networks
of Community and International Economic Law, in SOCIO-LEGAL APPROACHES TO
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: TEXT, CONTEXT, SUBTEXT 133 (Amanda Perry-Kessaris,
ed., 2013).
98. COTTERRELL, supra note 97, at 70.
99. Id. at 73.
100. Sassen is difficult to pigeonhole, but most of her appointments have been in sociology
departments.
101. SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS : FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL
ASSEMBLAGES (2006).
102. Id.
103. EMANUEL ADLER, COMMUNITARIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS : THE EPISTEMIC
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 15 (2005).
104. Id.
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routines, words, tools, ways of doing things, stories, symbols, and
discoursed” 105
Once common practices begin to be adopted, they can become selfsustaining due to network effects. As a number of scholars have observed,
legal culture and standardized legal practices can function as networks in the
economic sense.106 The most important economic characteristic of network
Q11V+ O+ *Pp* *PU Q11V+: (pL)U O2W,Up+U+ *PU 41,U )+U,+ pV1.* O*f +1 *Pp*
joining the network benefits not only the joiner, but also all the other
4U4oU,+ 1R *PU 2U*m1,Md =PO+ QO(U+ ,O+U *1 mPp* Pp+ oUU2 WpLLUV *PU “*O..j”
-)pLO*j 1R 4p,MU*+ R1, 2U*m1,M Q11V+d “]R p .p,*OW)Lp, 2U*m1,M +)WWUUV+ O2
attracting more and more adherents, a virtuous cycle will ensue, and the
4p,MU* mOLL <*O.: O2 Rp(1), 1R *Pp* +U* 1R +.UWOROWp*O12+ p2V O*+ +)..LOU,+d ZU++
successful competing networks will conversely enter into a vicious circle
mO*P RUmU, p2V RUmU, pVPU,U2*+d”107 The impact of network effects is such
*Pp*f “rpq+ W)+*14p,j 4U*P1V+ 1R W12V)W*O2Q o)+O2U++ oUW14U 41,U VUU.Lj
entrenched and widely followed, the system becomes progressively easier to
maintain and the process more difficult to reverse . . . . [S]tandardization
12Lj U2W1),pQU+ R),*PU, +*p2Vp,VOip*O12d” 108
Whichever vocabulary one adopts, these studies make clear that the
structure of transnational law is pluralistic and polycentric; it corresponds to
the structure of the overlapping national, subnational, and transnational
communities that contribute to it. 109 Functional differentiation is therefore
inherent to the logic of the transnational. Kjaer describes three distinct but
overlapping organizational logics: the territorial logic of the nation-state, the
functional logic of the transnational community, and the traditional
105. Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).
106. Most notably Ogus. See Anthony Ogus, The economic basis of legal culture:
networks and monopolization, 22(3) OX. J. LEG. STUD. 419-34 (2002) (arguing that “the
acknowledged characteristics of <legal culture:, a combination of language, conceptual
structure and procedures, constitute a network which . . . reduces the costs of interactive
behavior.”).
107. Id. at 422.
108. Druzin, supra note 36, at 1084.
109. Legal pluralists have long recognized that “people belong to (or feel affiliated with)
multiple groups and understand themselves to be bound by the norms of these multiple
groups.” Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1169 (2007).
Bruce L. Benson, The Law Merchant Story: How Romantic is it?, in LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 68 (Peer Zumbansen and Gralf-Peter Calliess eds., 2011); Peer
Zumbansen, Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance,
and Legal Pluralism, 21 TRANSNAT:L L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 305, 325 (2012); see also
Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law, Part II: Our Fragmenting Legal Community,
44 INT:L L. & POLITICS 1049, 1064 (2012) (“Legal communities can often overlap, as they did
in colonial societies where colonial and indigenous law often lived side-by-side, vying for
control.”).
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stratificatory logic of pre-modern society. 110 Given the social complexity of
modern society, the transnational logic of functional differentiation is
deepening and strengthening at the expense of the nation-+*p*U:+ *U,,O*1,OpL
logic.111
The fragmentation of public international law can be seen in the same
LOQP*d A+ !1PU2 VU+W,OoU+ O*f “rpq +O2QLU O2*U,national law community is
being replaced by separate, overlapping legal communities with significantly
VORRU,U2* (OUm+ 1R Lpm p2V LUQO*O4pWjd” 112 Even private law in domestic legal
systems has fragmented into different laws for different communities.
The compartmentalization of the classic general law of tort into a law
of specialized torts, for example, seems an irreversible state of affairs, to
which the law reacts by providing differentiated solutions for specific
interests and social fields. Nowadays, legal doctrine develops different
theories of tort for different social fields, and this is no accident. The practice
of the courts has destroyed the old unity of law guaranteed by doctrine and
has replaced it by a multiplicity of fragmented legal territories that live in
close contact with their neighboring territories in other social practices. 113
=PU *,p2+2p*O12pL +U**O2Q “1.U2+ ). p (O+*p 12 U2VLU++ W12R,12*p*O12+
and conflicts between different interest formations, rationalities, and
+*pMU+d”114 To determine the form that transnational contract law is likely to
*pMUf O* O+ *PU,UR1,U 2UWU++p,j *1 OVU2*ORj *PU +1WOpL 2U*m1,M+ *Pp* mOLL “mO2”
these confrontations and conflicts by exerting the greatest influence on
transnational contract law rules. These will not necessarily be the largest
networks, or the ones with the largest number of powerful or influential
members, but rather the networks that are the most cohesive and exhibit the
most intensive sustained interactionTin other words, the networks that
exhibit the strongest network effects. 115
With respect to contract law, state networks may be unable to provide
reliable frameworks of institutional or normative design suited for
international commercial communities. It may be unreasonable to subject
highly globalized webs of commercial relationships to the conflicting and
110. POUL F. KJAER, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE GLOBAL REALM : A SOCIOLOGICAL
APPROACH (2014).
111. Cotterrell, supra note 43, at 503; Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANNUAL
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243 (2009).
112. Cohen, supra note 109, at 1053; see also Michael Waibel, Interpretive Communities
in International Law, in INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Andrea Bianchi et al. eds.,
2014) (noting how the development of international law has been affected by the
characteristics of its interpreters).
113. Teubner, supra note 21, at 916 (quotations omitted).
114. Zumbansen, supra note 7, at 131.
115. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
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sometimes parochial or idiosyncratic rules of national legal systems, while
the prospects for concerted state action are not good. In the past, a few
powerful states were able to work in concert to create and shape international
legal orders like the GATT and IMF, which to a large extent served their
own interests.116 =1Vpjf P1mU(U,f *PU “*,pVO*O12pL” .1mU,+ U2N1j LU++
leverage at the very institutions they created, and overlapping tangles of
conflicting interests have slowed global-scale international rulemaking to a
crawl.117 Even where widespread consensus on basic principles exists,
rulemaking processes can take years and the establishment of institutions for
coordinated enforcement years more, by which time global commercial
patterns may have already moved on to a new paradigm. It is exactly in such
circumstances, where there is a mismatch between markets and law, that
non-state-centric transnational legal orders are most likely to spontaneously
emerge.118
Thus, the most influential networks are those composed of the
transnational (regional or global) community of businesses working in the
same industry sector. Globalized industries exhibit the stable sustained
interactions, sense of attachment, and webs of common understandings that
Cotterrell identifies as the hallmarks of distinct communities. 119 The
structure of these sectoral networks will determine the evolution of
transnational contract law.
Commercial parties are apt to prefer industry-particularism in law,
although they may not conceive of the issue in those terms. When disputes
arise, third party adjudication is usually a last resort; it is only worth the time
and money if negotiations and non-legal sanctions are ineffective. When
commercial parties do enter into adjudication, it should be fast, cheap,
private, predictable, fair, and enforceable. 120 Speed, cost, privacy, and
116. TERENCE C. H ALLIDAY & GREGORY SHAFFER, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 26-27
(2015).
117. See Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 734-38 (citing a range of statistics that show a
slowdown in formal international rulemaking); id. at 742 (attributing this slowdown in part to
the greater number of states actively involved in formal international rulemaking processes
and a flattening of power differentials among them).
118. HALLIDAY & SHAFFER, supra note 116, at 27.
119. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. As Druzin observes, “In many ways,
communities of merchants are like small communities. It is well acknowledged that
reputational costs and repetition are sufficient in small groups to bring about stable social
ordering.” See Druzin, supra note 36, 1063 (citing Ellickson:s classic study of ranchers in
Shasta County, California); ROBERT E LLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE BUSINESS DISPUTES (1994).
120. See, e.g., Joshua Karton, A Conflict of Interests: Seeking a Way Forward on
Publication of International Arbitral Awards, 28(3) ARB. INT:L 447, 458-61 (2012)
(explaining the current state of affairs within the international commercial arbitration system
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enforceability are procedural matters, so predictability and fairness are the
only matters related to the contract law that governs the substance of
disputes.
Fairness is often subjective, but when commercial parties think of a fair
outcome from a dispute resolution process, they probably mean a
commercially reasonable result similar to the state of affairs that would have
arisen if the contract had not been breached, or at least if the other party had
been cooperative in reaching a settlement. This stands in contrast to
conceptions of fairness in terms of deontological or consequentialist
morality, or corrective or distributive justice.
Fairness cannot be entirely separated from predictability. A predictable
result that is known to all in advance is likely to be seen as fair because
.p,*OU+ Wp2 p2V mOLL Pp(U 1,VU,UV *PUO, pRRpO,+ mO*P *PU ,)LU O2 4O2Vd “A+ p
general rule, business persons dislike uncertainty because it makes it difficult
to plan. . . . [P]arties are likely to value certainty and predictability, including
*PU p..LOWp*O12 1R M21m2 LUQpL .,O2WO.LU+d” 121 Predictability also means
efficiency. If the outcomes of an adjudicative process are predictable, legal
counsel can provide sound advice to their clients and commercial parties in
general on how to price their prospective performance when negotiating
contracts, as well as how to act in performing or deliberately breaching a
contract. When disputes do arise, settlements are both more likely to be
reached and easier to price accurately. 122 In short, legal certainty reduces
transaction costs.123
The dangers of unpredictability are multiplied when commerce crosses
borders. Counterparties may operate on the basis of different implicit norms,
which means that parties must either invest more resources in specifying
contractual terms in greater detail, or alternatively accept a greater risk that
the adjudicator of an eventual dispute may adopt an adverse interpretation of
the contract.124
in terms of conflicts between party and systemic interests).
121. Cindy G. Buys, The Tensions between Confidentiality and Transparency in
International Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT:L ARB. 121, 136 (2003).
122. See, e.g., Joshua Karton, The Arbitral Role in Contractual Interpretation, 6(1) J.
INT: L DISP. SETTLEMENT 1, 28 (2015) (stating that the better parties can predict how an arbitral
tribunal will decide, the more likely they are to reach a settlement).
123. See, e.g., Joshua Karton & Lorraine de Germiny, Has the CISG Advisory Council
Come of Age?, 27 BERK. J. INT:L L. 448, 448-49 (2009) (“A well-functioning commercial
system requires a high degree of legal certainty; businesses will hesitate to enter into
contractual relationships if they are unable to forecast the risks associated with breakdowns
in those relationships.”).
124. All contract drafting is a matter of balancing specification costs against interpretive
error costs. The more extensive and specific the terms of a written contract, the more likely
it is that the contract actually reflects the common intention of the parties, and that in an
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Cross-border commerce also brings the uncertainty created by conflict
of laws rules into the commercial relationship. For example, it is often
observed that the choice of law process has traditionally been marred by
complexity and uncertainty, 125 although the near-universal enforcement of
choice of law agreements and the increasing resort to presumptions about the
.p,*OU+: O2*U2* 4pMU+ WP1OWU 1R Lpm 41,U .,UVOW*poLU *Pp2 O2 *PU .p+*d 126 Such
)2WU,*pO2*j O4.1+U+ +j+*U4OW W1+*+B “;2WU,*pO2*j p* *PU *O4U 1R W12*,pW*O2Q
means that the parties cannot easily determine the standard of conduct to
which they should conform or how to price contract rights and duties . . . .
Uncertainty about choice of law at the time of litigation can increase both
*PU W1+*+ p2V R,U-)U2Wj 1R LO*OQp*O12d” 127 Higher transaction costs can deter
commercial parties from entering the cross-border market altogether. 128
Where there is no clear system of judicial hierarchy capable of imposing
consistent application of predetermined rules (as in transnational law),
predictability can be achieved two ways: through bright-line (nondiscretionary) rules or through rules that directly enforce the expectations of
commercial parties, such as adjudication according to trade usages or good
faith. To the extent that bright-line rules exist, commercial parties would
prefer them to be simple and clear, but also derogable and derived from
commercial practice. Indeed, much of the legislation on contract law, at least
for commercial contracts, relies on this twin notion of incorporation of
business practice and derogability. The bulk of Uniform Commercial Code
h;d!d!dg .,1(O+O12+ mU,U V,pR*UV O2 pWW1,Vp2WU mO*P *PU “O2W1,.1,p*O12
strategy”% T that is, the rules set out in the U.C.C., especially in Article 2,
are often codifications of trade usages or are otherwise patterned on business
eventual dispute, the adjudicator will interpret the contract consistently with that intention.
However, drafting and negotiating complex written provisions is expensive. See, e.g., Jody
S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, IN DEFENSE OF THE INCORPORATION STRATEGY, in THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 199 (Jody S. Kraus
& Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) (arguing that incorporation of commercial norms for gap-filling
purposes helps lower transaction costs). Adding an international dimension to the scenario
increases the risk of interpreter error; this incentivizes greater up-front expenditure to control
the meaning of contracts, but increased specification costs chill commercial deal-making.
Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 NW. U.L.J. 63, 105 (2015).
125. BERGER, supra note 35, at 10.
126. This is especially the case in EU jurisdictions covered by the Rome I Regulation. At
least with respect to contractual disputes, the modern choice of law process is often clear and
straightforward. Gilles Cuniberti, Three Theories of Lex Mercatoria, 52 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT:L L. 369, 392-93 (2014).
127. Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 253-54 (1993).
128. See, e.g., J.J. Callaghan, UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: Examining the Gap-Filling Role of CISG in Two French Decisions, 14 J.L. & COM.
183, 185 (1995) (“Enhancing certainty in the realm of international sales will greatly facilitate
the flow of international trade and serve the interests of all parties engaged in commerce.”).

172

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21:1

practices.129 When legal rules are derived from commercial practice, they
are likely to be seen as reasonable and predictable; when legal rules are
derogable, they permit commercial parties to adapt the rules to their
particular circumstances, reducing risk and increasing profitability.
For their part, rules that directly enforce the expectations of commercial
parties by privileging trade usages and good faith will inevitably be industryparticularist because standard practices vary by industry. Such rules are
contextual rather than bright-line, and therefore may appear to be
unpredictable or even arbitrary. However, they are predictable to
commercial parties because they are rooted in the context within which those
parties operate. Moreover, they are likely to be perceived as fair because
they yield the outcomes that commercial processes would normally produce
if both parties act reasonably and are motivated to cooperate.
In sum, industry-particularism, especially at the global level, provides
commercial parties with efficiency, predictability, and (their sense of)
fairness. Since networks of commercial parties are the most dynamic forces
in transnational legal rulemaking, transnational contract law will
increasingly reflect the sectoral divisions of the global economy.
B. Mechanisms of Fragmentation of Contract Law
Sectoral fragmentation of transnational contract law has proceeded
through at least four distinct mechanisms. First and most directly, industryspecific transnational legal rules (typically promulgated by trade
129. See, e.g., Jürgen Basedow, The State’s Private Law and the Economy: Commercial
Law as an Amalgam of Public and Private Rule-Making, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 703, 706 (2008)
(observing that legal systems frequently enact new rules that are codifications of existing
business practices); see also Kraus & Walt, supra note 124 (arguing that commercial practices
should often be decisive in contractual interpretation); Clayton P. Gillette, Harmony and
Stasis in Trade Usages for International Sales, 39 VA. J. INT:L L. 707, 707–09 (1999)
(concluding that custom should be used in contractual interpretation, despite its limitations).
Many leading scholars of contract law T and not only those who subscribe to “law and
economics” type priorities for the design of contract law rules T support the incorporation
strategy, along with a formalist approach to the interpretation of contract terms. In addition
to Kraus & Walt and Gillete, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded
Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73
CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985) (weighing the costs and benefits of an increase in the use of statecreated contract formulations and contextual incorporation). See also Scott, supra note 10
(recognizing the benefits of both incorporation and formalist approaches). But see
Woodward, supra note 10 (acknowledging that formalism might be justified in theory, but
arguing that its increased use will not improve contractual interpretation in practice). The
best-known opponent of the incorporation strategy is Lisa Bernstein, whose critique is based
primarily on empirical evidence that trade usages are not as certain or as widely followed as
the incorporationists appear to assume. Lisa Bernstein, supra note 124.
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associations and other non-state actors) have taken on greater importance,
harmonizing practices within each industry (regardless of the nationality of
the parties) and increasingly differentiating industries from one another.
Second, trade usages and other context-specific contract law rules are
increasingly privileged above rules of general applicability in individual
cases governed by national and transnational law. Third, widely-used
standard terms that choose the law of a particular country have effectively
made specific national laws the de facto global laws for different industries.
Fourth, specialist adjudicative bodies, especially international arbitral
tribunals, tend to prefer industry-particular solutions.
1. Generation of industry-specific rules of law
The most direct and obvious way for contract law to fragment sectorally
is the promulgation of industry-specific rules of contract law. This
corresponds most closely to the standard concept of fragmentation in the
public international law and private law literature, since it comes directly
from the multiplication of private sources of transnational rules. In keeping
with the variety of their sources, these rules can take various forms. Here are
the most common:
▪ Comprehensive standard form contracts that constitute a form of
global governance by virtue of their widespread adoption by participants in
a globalized industry sector, regardless of their nationality. 130 A good
example is the set of construction contracts forms developed by FIDIC (the
International Federation of Consulting Engineers). 131 In disputes where the
contracting parties adopt one of the FIDIC forms, the contract is frequently
so comprehensive that the dispute can be resolved without resort to any
exogenous rules of law (except, of course, the rules that govern the
enforceability and interpretation of contracts).
▪ Sets of alternative standardized contract terms from which parties
can choose. The best-M21m2 Ukp4.LU O+ *PU “W144U,WOpL *U,4+” )+UV O2 +pLU
of goods contractsTthe three-letter acronyms such as FOB or FAS that each
encode suites of obligations of buyer and seller (and, indirectly, carrier)
related to transportation of the goods. The commercial terms were developed
largely through the practices of English shipping clerks and the case law of
130. For a discussion of standard contracts as a form of governance, see chapters by Axel
Metzger, Hugh Collins, Thomas Ackermann, Giesela Rühl, and Andreas Engert, in
REGULATORY COMPETITION IN CONTRACT LAW AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Horst Eidenmüller
ed., 2013).
131. The various FIDIC forms are summarized at http://fidic.org/bookshop/aboutbookshop/which-fidic-contract-should-i-use [https://perma.cc/FK74-PJ2V].
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the English courts. However, they are today best known in the codified form
of the INCOTERMS promulgated by the International Chamber of
!144U,WU h]!!gd =PU ]X!A=a?Y>: mOVU+.,UpV )+U O2 +pLU+ p2V +PO..O2Q
contracts gives them the character of global private governance. They have
also taken on the character of legal rules through their application; in
international sale of goods disputes, tribunals have held that use of one of the
three-letter acronyms constitutes incorporation of the INCOTERM meaning
of that acronym (as opposed, for example, to the English common law
meaning). In this way, the INCOTERMS have grown beyond private
governance and become incorporated into public governance through state
entities.
▪ Self-contained sets of rules, drafted in the style of statutes. A
frequently-cited example is the Uniform Customs and Practices for
Documentary Credits (UCP), also promulgated by the ICC. References to
them (whether in contracts, regulations, or judgments) often use the language
of choice of law, such as a term in a letter of credit providing that the
O2+*,)4U2* O+ “Q1(U,2UV oj ;!@”% P1mU(U,f *PUj p,U oU**U, )2VU,+*11V p+
constituting contractual terms incorporated by reference and enforceable
between the parties on that basis. Properly speaking, they have no legal force
except to the extent that they are incorporated into private contracts. In some
cases, these kinds of rules are incorporated by states into their national
regulations or legislation or adopted as default rules in case law. For
Ukp4.LUf *PU KDFE “^pQ)U-8O+oj ?)LU+” ,ULp*O2Q *1 *PU Warriage of goods by
sea (formally the International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading) were codified in some states as
schedules to pre-existing legislation. 132 In England, the House of Lords
formally recognized the Hague-Visby Rules as applicable by default to
international bills of lading. 133 Revisions promulgated under the auspices of
UNCITRAL in Hamburg (1978) and Rotterdam (2009) represent modern
industry practice but have not yet been widely adopted by states.134
132. For example, in some countries, the Hague-Visby Rules relating to the carriage of
goods by sea have been codified as schedules to pre-existing domestic legislation. See, e.g.,
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1991 (Cth), sch 1 (Austl.) (codifying the Hague-Visby Rules
in the Australian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act through a schedule); see also Marine Liability
Act, S.C. 2001, c 6, Part 5 and Schedule 3 (Can.) (incorporating the Hague-Visby Rules into
the Marine Liability Act by virtue of a schedule).
133. JI MacWilliam Co. Inc. v. Mediterranean Shipping Co., SA [2005] UKHL 11, [2005]
2 AC 423.
134. G.A. Res. 63/122, annex, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (Dec. 11, 2008) (“The Rotterdam
Rules”), http://www.rotterdamrules2009.com/cms/index.php [https://perma.cc/7ZTD-8UD
E]; these represent a significant step forward in that they are the first set of shipping rules that
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▪ “!14412 Lpm” .,O2WO.LU+ p,O+O2Q R,14 *PU VUWO+O12+ 1R
international tribunals on international commercial disputes. These go under
various names (lex mercatoria, general principles of international
commercial law, etc.) and their vitality and legitimacy are debated.
However, the existence of at least a few substantive principles of law that are
regularly followed in international adjudication is undeniable. Of these, the
most successful exist with respect to specific types of transactions or specific
industry sectors, such as the lex petrolea135 and lex sportiva. More loosely,
commentators agree that a de facto system of precedent (technically nonbinding but normally followed) now exists in some areas of international
contract law, especially with respect to sports. 136
▪ Codes of best practices and product standards enacted to help
harmonize business operations. These may be incorporated directly into
contracts by dominant parties (in individual contracts or throughout a supply
chain), but they also may be drafted by industry groups and not intended to
assume a coercive character. Either way, they are often binding on market
participants in practice and, in disputes, may be decisive evidence of trade
usages.137
Except for case law, these forms of lawmaking all involve some kind
of codification of standard practices. Transnational contract law as a whole

extend to shipment by both land and sea, so that the Rotterdam Rules for the first time make
it possible to have a single set of rules apply to all stages of shipping of goods from the seller:s
premises to the buyer:s premises.
135. The seminal publication on the topic describes published arbitral awards as “the
source material from which customary law may be drawn.” R. Doak Bishop, International
Arbitration of Petroleum Disputes: The Development of a “Lex Petrolea” (Centre for
Petroleum & Mineral Law & Policy, Discussion Paper No. DP 12, 1, 1997), reprinted in 23
Ybk. Comm. Arb. 1131, 1131 (1998); see also Thomas C.C. Childs, Update on Lex Petrolea:
The Continuing Development of Customary Law Relating to International Oil and Gas
Exploration and Production, 4 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 214, 214-15 (2011) (describing
lex petrolea as “legal rules developed by arbitral tribunals. . . . that reflect the specific
characteristics of the international exploration and production industry.”).
136. The same is true of some distinct areas of public international law. For example,
consistent lines of authority functioning somewhat like national systems of precedent have
been identified in investment treaty arbitration and WTO dispute resolution.
137. See, e.g., Thomas Dietz & Holger Nieswandt, The Emergence of Transnational
Cooperation in the Software Industry, in CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
87 (Volkmar Gessner ed., 2009) (examining the role of contract enforcement institutions in
cross-border software development contracts); Edward Elgar, PRIVATE STANDARDS AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Axel Marx et al. eds., 2012) (evaluating the legitimacy, efficiency,
and extent of privately-generated standards); HARM SCHEPEL, THE CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE
GOVERNANCE : PRODUCT STANDARDS IN THE REGULATION OF INTEGRATING MARKETS (Hugh
Collins et al. eds., 2005) (assessing the function of private standards in modern governance).
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is sometimes characterized as codified trade usages, 138 but this is too
reductionist. Codification efforts inevitably go beyond the simple setting
down of standard practices. They require intense negotiation even among
parties with broadly similar experience and outlook. Bernstein cites various
studies to the effect that claims of widespread trade usage are overblown,
from the medieval era to the modern day. 139 Parties within a common
industry often did not share significant common understandings of the same
obligations unless and until they organized themselves to codify a set of
standard practices. These codification efforts were characterized by
significant disagreement and compromises. 140 In other words, codification
of trade usages is rule-creation, not just rule-transcription.
Transnational rule-creation necessarily implies a degree of
fragmentation, since it involves a range of non-state sources of law, although
it does not necessarily involve sectoral fragmentation. After all, lex
mercatoria T *PU -)O2*U++U2*OpL “p)*12141)+” *,p2+2p*O12pL Lpm T is
conceived as constituting the law of global commerce as opposed to
domestic commerce T that is, the rules of international trade writ large, as
opposed to the rules of particular globalized industries. 141
But the utopian project of establishing a general common law of
international commerce, truly autonomous from state law, has not proceeded
very far. For the present, at least, state approval and cooperation is a
necessity.142 To the extent that lex mercatoria has any real-world impact, it
138. See, e.g., Cristián Gimenez Corte, Lex Mercatoria, International Arbitration and
Independent Guarantees: Transnational Law and How Nation States Lost the Monopoly of
Legitimate Enforcement, 3 TRANSNAT:L L. THEORY 345, 348 (2012) (stating that “[t]he lex
mercatoria is a transnational expression of one source of law: customary law. A customary
rule may arise out of a generalised repetition of similar practices, over a certain period of time.
In the case of the lex mercatoria, these common practices develop through contracts, in
particular international commercial contracts.”).
139. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern Economy 3-12 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for
Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 639, 2013). These studies are controversial. See, e.g.,
Clayton P. Gillette, Harmony and Stasis in Trade Usages for International Sales, 39 VA. J.
INT: L L. 707, 710 n.10 (1999) (criticizing the premises upon which Bernstein rests her
conclusion); see also William J. Woodward, Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001
WISC. L. REV. 971, 984 (2001) (claiming that Bernstein:s conclusion is overly broad and
unwarranted). However, according to Bernstein, no contradictory empirical studies have been
published.
140. Id.
141. See Cuniberti, supra note 126 (describing lex mercatoria as a reflection of
international custom and norms).
142. Cf. Michaels, supra note 59, at 466 (stating that “[i]f there is an autonomous legal
system of international commerce, then it transcends the divide between state and non-state
law, and its autonomy is not from the state but rather from other parts of the law, many of
which remain national.”).
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is because states are willing to enforce arbitral awards applying it. 143
Perhaps more importantly, commercial parties have repeatedly
demonstrated their antipathy toward lex mercatoria. In the vast majority of
arbitrations where the contract contains a choice of law provision, the parties
nominate the law of some state. Data from the ICC shows that, on a
consistent basis, fewer than 2% of parties whose contracts contain ICC
arbitration clauses expressly choose to be governed by non-national rules.144
Of the remainder, an unknown but likely significant portion select a treaty or
other codified instrument such as the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) or UNIDROIT
@,O2WO.LU+ 1R ]2*U,2p*O12pL !144U,WOpL !12*,pW*+ h“;X]t?A]=
@,O2WO.LU+”gf LUp(O2Q p *O2j ,U4pO2VU, 1R Wp+U+ Uk.,U++Lj WP11+O2Q lex
mercatoria or general principles as the governing law. Of these, most are
the products of awkward compromises between private parties and
government entities, where the contracting parties cannot agree to be bound
by the same national law. 145
=PU LOMULj +1),WU 1R W144U,WOpL .p,*OU+: Wontinued preference for
national laws is the wild uncertainty that lex mercatoria represents. Its
notorious vagueness means that it can be applied arbitrarily, rendering it
“POQPLj )2LOMULj *Pp* O* 4UU*+ *PU 2UUV+ 1R O2*U,2p*O12pL 4U,WPp2*+”d 146 Even
if, as Gaillard argues, one should see lex mercatoria as a comparative method
for deriving legal rules, rather than a set of rules in itself, 147 this would still
give adjudicators enormous flexibility. 148
Where transnational law has met with favor, it has been in codified
forms that can be read, understood, and applied in a predictable manner. 149
These codifications have been undertaken primarily by industry players and
industry groups,150 which have drafted contract terms, product standards,
measurement conventions, and so on. Unsurprisingly, these differ based on
143. David W. Rivkin, Enforceability of Awards Based on Lex Mercatoria, 9 ARB. INT:L
67 (1993).
144. Cuniberti, supra note 126, at 399 (summarizing data from several years of the ICC
International Court of Arbitration:s annual statistical reports, and observing that these
statistics may actually overstate the number of contracts that chose non-national rules of law).
On the laws favoured by parties to international commercial arbitrations, see Gilles Cuniberti,
The International Market for Contracts: The Most Attractive Contract Laws, 23 NW. J. INT:L
L. & BUS. 455 (2014).
145. Gimenez Corte, supra note 138, at 355.
146. Cuniberti, supra note 126, at 384.
147. Emmanuel Gaillard, Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria: Towards the Selective
Application of Transnational Rules, 10 ICSID REV.TF.I.L.J. 208, 226 (1995).
148. Cuniberti, supra note 126, at 391.
149. KARTON, supra note 79, at 130.
150. The one significant exception is the EU.
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the industry involved and its particular circumstances. They are not only
more specific than lex mercatoria, but are also likely to be more tailored to
the needs of the particular industry than national laws.151 In this way, the
transnational rulemaking process tends toward sectoral fragmentation.
2. Wide application of trade usages as direct sources of rights and
obligations
Trade usages may not in themselves constitute legal rules, but they act
like legal rules to the extent that the law directs adjudicators to decide
according to them. Trade usages have two functions in contract law, one
interpretive and one gap-filling. These are conceptually distinct, although in
practice the line between them is often unclear. Some legal systems do not
distinguish between them, seeing gap-filling as an aspect of interpretation.
To the extent that usages supply unspecified contractual terms into
contracts, as opposed to clarifying the meaning of terms that the parties have
specified, they constitute a freestanding source of contract law rules. When
the law privileges those rules over default rules derived from statutes or case
law, it effectively prioritizes private ordering over public ordering. Since
standard practices T in both contract drafting and performance T vary from
industry to industry, trade usages as sources of legal obligations are also
sector-specific.
National legal systems have long been friendly to the introduction of
evidence of industry practice when interpreting contracts. In civil law
jurisdictions, where courts are directed to consider all evidence that may be
)+UR)L *1 VU*U,4O2U p W12*,pW*:+ 4Up2O2Qf *,pVU )+pQU+ p,U W12+OVU,UV p+ p
matter of course. In common law jurisdictions, evidence of practices
established within the relevant industry or between the contracting parties is
admissible to interpret contracts under well-recognized exceptions to the
parol evidence rule.
However, courts in recent years have relied heavily on evidence of
industry practice, not just when determining the intention of the parties, but
also to define the content of matters not expressly or impliedly specified in
p W12*,pW*d =PO+ O+ +14U*O4U+ ,URU,,UV *1 p+ “W12*Uk*)pLOiUV pVN)VOWp*O12”
T the phenomenon of courts considering the commercial context of a
transaction in adjudicating disputes. 152
Contextualized adjudication
inevitably leads to sectorally fragmented law.

151. Cuniberti, supra note 126, at 393-94.
152. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 124, at 63 (arguing against contextualized
adjudication involving the ready incorporation of trade usages).
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A good example from outside the United States is the landmark House
of Lords judgment in Transfield Shipping Inc. v. Mercator Shipping Inc. (The
Achilleas).153 The case considered the measure of damages for late
redelivery of a chartered ship. The charterers redelivered the ship nine days
late, and the owners experienced a substantial loss on the next charter of the
+PO. h*PU “R1LL1m-12 ROk*),U”g oUWp)+U *PU 2Uk* WPp,*U,U, Wp2WULUV O*+ W12*,pW*
with the owners, market rates having dropped significantly in the meantime.
The owners argued that the charterers owed damages based on the loss of the
higher rate for the entirety of the next charter, while the charterers argued
that these losses were too remote, and that they owed only the difference
between the market rate and the charter rate for the nine-day period of delay.
A consistent line of precedent supported the view that damages could
be claimed for lost profits on the entirety of the follow-on fixture, and an
arbitral tribunal and the lower courts held that the owners could recover all
of the damages they claimed. In the abstract, loss of profits from a followon fixture is a reasonably foreseeable T even highly likely T consequence
of late redelivery of a ship. However, the House of Lords held that
determinations of remoteness must be made not on the basis of reasonable
R1,U+UUpoOLO*jf o)* O2+*UpV “).12 *PU O2*U2*O12 1R *PU .p,*OU+ h1oNUW*O(ULj
p+WU,*pO2UVg oUWp)+U pLL W12*,pW*)pL LOpoOLO*j O+ (1L)2*p,OLj )2VU,*pMU2d” 154 It
mp+ 21* W12*U+*UV *Pp* *PU “+U**LUV )2VU,+*p2VO2Q” 1R *PU +PO..O2Q O2V)+*,j
was that damages for late delivery should be limited to the period of delay.
Accordingly, the court reasoned that the parties could not have intended that
charterers should assume responsibility for the entirety of the follow-on
fixture:
If one considers what these parties, contracting against the
background of market expectations found by the arbitrators, would
reasonably have considered the extent of the liability they were
undertaking, I think it is clear that they would have considered
losses arising from the loss of the following fixture a type or kind
of loss for which the charterer was not assuming responsibility. 155
In this judgment, the House of Lords effectively raised the commercial
context of the deal above general law when determining the scope of liability
arising under a contract, justifying this decision by reference to the
153. [2008] UKHL 48, [2009] 1 AC 61.
154. Id. at para. 12. The decision was unanimous although the reasoning was not. The
speeches of Lord Hoffman and Lord Hope of Craighead emphasized this factor and have been
taken as the leading speeches. On the approaches taken by the different Lords, see Greg
Gordon, Hadley v. Baxendale Revisited: Transfield Shipping Inc. v. Mercator Shipping Inc.,
13 EDINBURGH L. REV. 125, 127-29 (2009).
155. Transfield Shipping Inc., [2008] UKHL 48, at para. 23.
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consensual nature of contractual liability. The decisive point was the
expectations of commercial parties in the particular context of charter
contracts in the shipping industry. 156 =PU W14412 Lpm:+ Rp41)+ “,Up+12poLU
.U,+12” mp+ VO+.LpWUV O2 Rp(1), 1R +14U*PO2Q 4)WP 41,U +.UWOROWB 21* U(U2
*PU “,Up+12poLU +PO. WPp,*U,U,f” o)* *PU .,U+)4UV O2*U2*O12 1R *PU +.UWOROW
ship charterer in the individual case. 157 Subsequent cases have cited The
Achilleas to hold that determinations of remoteness in other industries should
be made based on the commercial expectations of members of the industry.158
As a result, the scope of contractual liability for damages has become a
context-specific inquiry that varies depending upon the line of business of
the parties to each dispute. 159
7PU2 mU L11M *1 *,p2+2p*O12pL Lpmf *PU O4.pW* 1R *PU W12*,pW*:+
commercial context T whether as a source of information o2 *PU .p,*OU+:
intentions for the purposes of contractual interpretation, as the decisive factor
in the application of a doctrine like remoteness, or most directly as the source
of contractual terms implied from trade usage T is even stronger. The major

156. See Edwin Peel, Remoteness Re-Visited, 125 (Jan) L. Q. REV. 6, 9 (2009) (concluding
that “[i]n The Achilleas . . . the damages claimed were too remote because, although a lost
fixture was foreseen as not unlikely, the presumption that the losses flowing from it could be
recovered was rebutted by the particular context of the market in which they occurred . . . .”).
157. The Achilleas appears to have been accepted in a range of Commonwealth
jurisdictions, with the notable exception of Singapore, where the Court of Appeal rejected the
novel conception of remoteness and reaffirmed of the traditional Hadley v. Baxendale “rule
of law” approach. See MFM Restaurants Pte. Ltd. v Fish & Co. Restaurants Pte. Ltd., [2010]
SGCA 36, [2011] 1 SLR 150 (explicitly rejecting the holding in The Achilleas and
maintaining the traditional approach articulated in Hadley); see also Mindy Chen-Wishart,
Legal Transplant and Undue Influence: Lost in Translation or a Working Misunderstanding?,
62 INT:L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 4 n.16 (2013) (characterizing MFM Restaurants as a rare exception
to the general rule that, in Singapore, English contract and commercial judgments are
“overwhelmingly accepted as persuasive and routinely applied to like effect”).
158. See, e.g., John Grimes P:ship Ltd. v. Gubbins, [2013] EWCA (Civ) 37, [2013] B.L.R.
126 (CA) (holding that the liability of a contractor for construction delays in a falling real
estate market turned on whether there was a general understanding or expectation in the
property world that a party in the defendant:s position would be taken to have assumed
responsibility for such losses).
159. Although this result was revolutionary in England, it does not seem striking from an
American point of view. For example, in the United States, consequential damages may
generally be recovered where the breaching party had “reason to know” of such damages at
the time of contracting, a test that was adopted into U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (2002). However,
this provision overturned an older common law rule that consequential damages are
recoverable only where there was “tacit agreement” to their recovery. The tacit agreement
test traces back more than a century to Justice Holmes:s decision in Globe Refining Co. v.
Landa Cotton Oil Co. 190 U.S. 540 (1903). But see Clayton P. Gillette, Tacit Agreement and
Relationship-Specific Investment, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 128 (2013) (arguing that the tacit
agreement test is superior to the reason-to-know test).
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transnational contract law instruments all direct tribunals to give significant
weight to commercial context in contractual interpretation and to trade
usages as sources of legal rights and obligations.
The CISG is illustrative. Under CISG article 8(3), when interpreting
W12*,pW*+f V)U W12+OVU,p*O12 O+ *1 oU QO(U2 *1 “pLL ,ULU(p2* WO,W)4+*p2WU+ 1R
the case, including the negotiations, any course of conduct or performance
between the parties, any relevant usages, and any subsequent conduct of the
.p,*OU+d” 160 More importantly, article 9(2) provides:
The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly
made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties
knew or ought to have known and which in international trade is widely
known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved
in the particular trade concerned. 161
This provision has been held to mean that, unless expressly disclaimed,
usages themselves impose binding obligations on the parties, even when the
.p,*OU+ p,U 21* pmp,U 1R *PU4d A+ 12U W1),* p..LjO2Q p,*OWLU DhJg PULVf “*PU
usages and practices of the parties or the industry are automatically
incorporated into any agreement governed by the Convention, unless
expressly excluded by the pp,*OU+d” 162 They prevail over contrary provisions
in the CISG itself (except for a small number of mandatory provisions) 163
and have even been held to prevail over the apparent plain meaning of
.,1(O+O12+ O2 *PU .p,*OU+: W12*,pW*d 164
160. Inclusion of an entire agreement clause (also called a merger or integration clause)
may bar evidence of trade usages, but only if the parties intend it to have that effect. CISG
Advisory Council (CISG-AC) Opinion No. 3, Parol Evidence Rule, Plain Meaning Rule,
Contractual Merger Clause and the CISG, 23 October 2004. Rapporteur: Professor Richard
Hyland, Rutgers Law School, Camden, NJ, USA at para 2.2.
161. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr.
11, 1980, S.Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 (1983), UN Doc. No. A/CONF 97/19, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
162. CLOUT Case No. 579 [U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, 10 May
2002], available at www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/020510u1.html#vi [https://pe
rma.cc/29EA-QQBH].
163. See, e.g., CLOUT Case No. 425 [Oberster Gerichtshof, Austria, 21 March 2000],
available at www.cisg.at/10_34499g.htm [https://perma.cc/6BVB-CTVK] (refusing to
overturn a trial court decision that relied on an industry usage that differed from the default
rules in the CISG ); CLOUT Case No. 240 [Oberster Gerichtshof, Austria, 15 October 1998]
(remanding for a trial court to determine whether usages alleged to prevail in the lumber trade
were widely known and regularly observed in that industry).
164. ICC Case No. 9443 of 1998, 4 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1106-112 (2002).
This is, however, the minority position. Most courts have held that, since party autonomy is
a fundamental principle underlying the CISG, contractual terms prevail over usages. See, e.g.,
Hof van Beroep Antwerpen, Belgium, 24 April 2006, English translation available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060424b1.html [https://perma.cc/P3NK-XYP7] (holding
that the usages should only govern if the contract does not contain a clear term); CLOUT Case
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Moreover, under the CISG but not the national law of many states, a
party relying on a usage need not prove that the other party was actively or
constructively aware of it, but only that it is widely recognized in the relevant
industry and geographical region. 165 In other words, market entrants
effectively have an obligation to inform themselves of usages in the
industry.166
The same principle T that usages observed in the industry
automatically apply unless expressly excluded, even if it cannot be proven
that the parties actually or constructively knew of the usages T can also be
found in the UNIDROIT Principles 167 and the Principles of European
Contract Law.168 The online CENTRAL compilation of lex mercatoria rules,
Principle I.2.2, states a similar rule. 169 This reversal of the standard posture
in most domestic legal systems indicates what is often thought of as the
greater deference to trade usages in transnational than in national contract
laws. But it goes beyond deference; the treatment of trade usages in
transnational contract law instruments is such that they act like derogable
statutory rules. They apply broadly to contracts entered into by parties from
the same industry, regardless of whether the parties actively or impliedly
considered them. 170 As such, they can be overridden only by express
No. 292 [Oberlandesgericht Saarbrücken, Germany, 13 January 1993] (finding insufficient
evidence of a usage contrary to the plain language of the contract); Treibacher Industrie, A.G.
v. Allegheny Technologies, Inc., 464 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the parties:
apparent interpretation of a term as revealed through their particular course of dealing
prevailed over a contrary usage widely observed in the industry).
165. See, e.g., CLOUT Case No. 240 [Oberster Gerichtshof, Austria, 15 October 1998]
(holding that, when applying the CISG, courts should examine whether usages are widely
known and regularly observed in an industry, as opposed to inquiring into the specific
knowledge the parties had of that usage).
166. Martin Schmidt-Kessel, Article 9, in SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER COMMENTARY ON
THE UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL S ALE OF GOODS (CISG) 191
(3d English ed., Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 2010). Under CISG art. 9(2), if it can be shown that
a relevant usage is “objectively known”, then a “lack of due care” is imputed to a party that
claims ignorance of the usage. Id. at 191. Note, however, that at least one court has held that
commercial parties are only bound to industry usages if they have continuously transacted
business in the industry for a considerable period of time. CLOUT Case No. 425 [Oberster
Gerichtshof, Austria, 21 March 2000], also available at www.cisg.at/10_34499g.htm
[https://perma.cc/H778-YLKQ].
167. Art. 1.8, which repeats verbatim the language of CISG art. 9(2).
168. Art 1:105(2) (“The parties are bound by a usage which would be considered generally
applicable by persons in the same situation as the parties, except where the application of such
usage would be unreasonable.”).
169. Berger, K. (2018). The Lex Mercatoria and the TransLex-Principles. Trans-lex.org.
Available at: https://www.trans-lex.org/the-lex-mercatoria-and-the-translex-principles_ID8
[https://perma.cc/M9NL-8KHE].
170. If a usage is widely observed in an industry, then ipso facto the parties should be
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agreements to the contrary or by supervening laws of a mandatory or nonderogable character. The treatment of trade usages in transnational law thus
contributes directly to the sectoral fragmentation.
3. Industry-wide choice of specific national laws
The third mechanism by which sectoral fragmentation of contract law
may occur is the pervasive choice of individual national laws by parties from
particular industries, such that different national laws become the de facto
global laws of different industries. This form of sectoral fragmentation is an
underappreciated aspect of transnational contractual governance, less
glamorous and more straightforward than the formal promulgation or
informal evolution of transnational law rules. It is largely a consequence of
the near-universal enforcement of contractual choice of law clauses in
modern private international law. 171 Parties may exercise their autonomy in
choice of law to choose non-state rules, but they are more likely to choose to
be governed by the law of some national jurisdiction. To the extent that
parties in different industries consistently choose different national laws, the
effect is sectoral fragmentation. 172
Parties generally exercise their autonomy over the applicable law by
WP11+O2Q *1 oU Q1(U,2UV oj *PU Lpm 1R 12U .p,*j:+ P14U +*p*U 1, *Pp* 1R p
small number of established states. 173 In some sectors, a particular national
law is chosen so frequently that it has effectively become the global law of
the industry.174 The best example, one with a long history, is the adoption of
considered to have impliedly considered that usage.
171. See PETER NYGH, AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 13 (1999) (referring to
the “triumph of party autonomy” as evidenced by the fact that all European Economic
Community states had enshrined the principle of autonomy for choice of law); SYMEON C.
SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF LAW AROUND THE WORLD: AN INTERNATIONAL
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS Chapter 3 (2014) (describing the triumph of party autonomy with
respect to choice of law).
172. Arato has made a similar point relating to public international law; he argues that
corporations have acquired the power to create primary rules of international law, in part
because of the ability of investors to effectively choose which investment treaties will apply
to their investments by making investments through special purpose vehicles incorporated in
states that have agreed to treaty terms favourable to the investor:s rights in the given
transaction. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56(2) HARV. INT: L L.J. 229 (2015). I
submit that this phenomenon is analogous to the ability of private parties to choose the law
that will govern their relationship, often successfully avoiding application of unfavorable
mandatory rules of the national law that would otherwise apply.
173. See generally Cuniberti, supra note 144 (showing empirically that parties:
preferences are generally homogenous, opting for the laws of a few jurisdictions that dominate
the international market for contracts).
174. The most comprehensive general treatment of this phenomenon to date is ERIN A.

184

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21:1

English law for charter parties and other international shipping contracts. 175
This history is preserved in the standard form contracts most frequently used
for shipping contracts, those issued by the Baltic and International Maritime
Council (BIMCO), all of which provide for application of English law. 176
Preferred national laws can shift over time, as states may compete to
promote their laws and courts. 177 For example, if a given state enacts a proinsurer regulatory regime, insurance companies will rush to include a choice
1R *Pp* +*p*U:+ Lpm O2 *PUO, +*p2Vp,V R1,4+d 178 This enhances sectoral
fragmentation because of the interplay with territorial fragmentation along
state boundaries.
Even when transnational law governs the entirety of a dispute, industry
preferences for particular national laws may have an indirect influence. For
example, a dispute over a sale of goods contract governed by the CISG will
often require reference to other bodies of legal rules, since the CISG by its
1m2 *U,4+ Q1(U,2+ 12Lj “the formation of the contract of sale and the rights
p2V 1oLOQp*O12+ 1R *PU +ULLU, p2V *PU o)jU, p,O+O2Q R,14 +)WP p W12*,pW*d” 179
Yp**U,+ +)WP p+ *PU Wp.pWO*j 1R *PU .p,*OU+ *1 W12*,pW* 1, *PU .p,*OU+: .,1.U,*y
rights in the goods must be determined according to the national law or laws
that would otherwise apply but for the application of the CISG. The CISG
is not a comprehensive legal system, and operates within the context of one
or more broadly-applicable bodies of law.
Similarly, if the parties adopt a privately-generated set of rules, such as
the ISDA Master Agreement used in securities transactions, this may
O:HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009).
175. As noted by Lord Wright in Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Company [1939]
AC 277, 290.
176. Available at https://www.bimco.org/Chartering/Documents.aspx. All of the BIMCO
standard forms also provide for arbitration in London, which means that the English
Arbitration Act would govern arbitrations arising from them. See also Wendy Miles, Do
England’s expansive grounds for recourse increase delay and interference in arbitration?,
80(1) ARBITRATION 35, 43-44 (2014) (describing how standard clauses may lead to the
involvement of English courts in an arbitration that was chosen precisely to avoid those
courts).
177. It is not controversial that some degree of regulatory competition exists with respect
to contract law, but its extent may be overstated. See Cuniberti, supra note 126; Stefan
Vogenauer, Regulatory Competition Through Choice of Contract Law and Choice of Forum
in Europe: Theory and Evidence, in REGULATORY COMPETITION IN CONTRACT LAW AND
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 227 (Horst Eidenmüller ed., 2013) (both presenting empirical evidence
that commercial parties often do not consider the actual content of national contract laws when
they make a choice of law).
178. For example, in the US, most consumer credit contracts are made subject to the laws
of South Dakota or Delaware, states that have enacted laws favorable to creditors. O:HARA
& RIBSTEIN, supra note 174, at 145-48.
179. Convention for the International Sale of Goods Art. 4.
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indicate a desire to subject their transaction to non-state norms. However, it
does not necessarily show that they intend that this private regime should be
entirely self-sufficient. After all, no matter how complex and detailed such
standard form contracts or sets of rules may be, they normally also include a
choice of law clause providing for the choice of some national law. This
“+P1m+ *Pp* *PU .p,*OU+ ,UW1Q2OiU *Pp* *PUO, W12*,pW* ,U4pO2+ Qoverned by a
national law and that the source of their power to design a private normative
regime is a rule of that national law that recognizes the freedom of
W12*,pW*d”180
Finally, as discussed above, 181 codified transnational rules are often
drafted by (or at least with the input of) private commercial actors. Since
transnational rules are typically borrowed from existing national models
(either picking and choosing preferred doctrines 182 or forging compromises
between them), 183 to the extent that particular national laws are dominant,
that dominance may be reflected in the choices made by the drafters of
transnational rules.
4. Choice of Specialist Adjudicative Bodies, Especially Arbitral
Tribunals
When the adjudicative bodies that apply legal rules proliferate,
normative fragmentation inevitably follows institutional fragmentation. 184
Normative fragmentation need not occur along sectoral lines, but in practice,
the specialized adjudicative bodies that apply transnational contract law in
cross-border business disputes are likely to promote sectoral fragmentation.
Specialist business tribunals, whether judicial or arbitral in structure,
tend over time to adopt commercial perspectives. Only individuals with
relevant commercial law experience (and who therefore have a long history
of representing business interests) are likely to be appointed. Once
appointed, they are likely to hear only from counsel to commercial entities.
180. Cuniberti, supra note 126, at 375.
181. See supra Section III.B.1.
182. Such as the adoption of Nachfrist doctrine into the CISG and UNIDROIT Principles
from the law of Germanic states. See, e.g., Ulrich Magnus, The Vienna Sales Convention
(CISG) between Civil and Common Law%Best of all Worlds?, 3 J. CIV. LEG. STUD. 67, 86-87
(2010) (describing how the CISG utilized the German concept of Nachfrist, taking parts of
doctrine when useful and otherwise leaving them aside).
183. Such as the awkward and still-contested status of good faith in the CISG. See, e.g.,
Bruno Zeller, Good Faith % The Scarlet Pimpernel of the CISG, 7 INT: L TRADE & BUS. L.
ANN. 2 (2000) (noting that although the CISG mandates good faith interpretation of the
convention itself, it does not define what good faith involves).
184. See supra Section III.D.
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Such tribunals therefore tend to give priority to trade usages over blackletter
principles, which, for the reasons described above, necessarily leads to
sectoral fragmentation. 185
These characteristics are particularly evident in the mode of
transnational dispute resolution that is most flexible and most tied to the
business community: international commercial arbitration. Arbitrators are
private contractors; they provide a service (resolution of disputes) and are
compensated for that service by their clients (the disputing parties). 186 The
bulk of international arbitration practitioners see their collective and
individual role as serving the interests of commerce, and the interests of the
.p,*OU+ mP1 p..Up, oUR1,U *PU4d A+ _nLO2p+ .)*+ O*f “rOq2*U,2p*ional
p,oO*,p*O12 UkO+*+ *1 +U,(U *PU 2UUV+ 1R O2*U,2p*O12pL o)+O2U++d” 187 Lord
Y)+*OLL *pMU+ *PU p,Q)4U2* p +*U. R),*PU,B “rWq144U,WOpL p,oO*,p*O12 UkO+*+
for one purpose only: to serve the commercial man. If it fails in this, it is
unworthy of serious st)Vjd”188 The connection between arbitration and
sectoral fragmentation is strong and clear enough that it deserves special
attention. If commercial parties in general prefer an industry-particularistic
contract law, arbitrators are apt to deliver it even when the parties to a given
arbitration do not ask for it.
Arbitrators have long prided themselves on possessing a commercial
mentality, augmented by deep industry knowledge, and surveys confirm that
industry expertise is one of the most important factors in arbitral
appointments.189 ^U,4p22 VUWLp,U+B “]* O+ R)2Vp4U2*pL *1 p,oO*,p*O12 *Pp* O*
should solve disputes according to commercial practice and common sense,
185. See supra Section III.B.2.
186. This is not to say that arbitrators act only as service providers, or that they ought to
do so. At minimum, arbitrators are not service providers in the ordinary sense, since they
must serve both disputing parties, who have opposing interests. See, e.g., CATHERINE A.
ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 346-49 (2014) (rejecting the idea that
arbitrators are service providers on the ground that such a view would ignore their
adjudicatory rule). Nevertheless, arbitrators are often described as “agents” of the parties.
See, e.g., GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1607-09 (3d ed., 2009)
(arguing that while arbitrators serve the interests of both parties, they should not be considered
agents of either party).
187. Fabien Gélinas, Arbitration and the Challenge of Globalisation, 17(4) J. INT:L ARB.
117, 117 (2000).
188. Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-Five Years, 4(2) ARB
INT: L 86, 86 (1988). See also Yves Fortier, The New, New Lex Mercatoria, or, Back to the
Future, 17(2) ARB INT:L 121, 121 (2001) (characterizing Mustill:s statement as “the essential
creed of the commercial arbitrator”).
189. Schultz & Kovacs, supra note 82, at 165-68; 2010 International Arbitration Survey:
Choices in International Arbitration, White & Case and Queen Mary University of London
26, available at http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2010_International
ArbitrationSurveyReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ83-XUG5].
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p,,O(O2Q p* p ,U+)L* W12+OVU,UV RpO, O2 p .p,*OW)Lp, o)+O2U++ W144)2O*jd” 190
Collins con*,p+*+ *PU “W144U,WOpL ,Up+12O2Q” U4.L1jUV oj p,oO*,p*1,+ mO*P
*PU “.,O(p*U Lpm ,Up+12O2Q” U4.L1jUV oj W1),*+B
Private law reasoning is relatively closed to the competing normative
considerations governing contractual behaviour outside the discrete
communication system provided by the formal contract itself . . .
Commercial arbitration appears to be favoured precisely because it can
provide . . . reasoning which marries adjudicated outcomes with business
expectations more closely. 191
The primary practical manifestation of this commercial mentality is the
primacy given in arbitral awards to arguments based on trade usages and
commercial reasonableness. 192 In an apparent exception to their normal
deference to party autonomy, arbitral tribunals sometimes apply trade usages
when the parties have not raised them and may find that a trade usage
governs even absent evidence that the parties were aware of it. 193
Institutional rules of arbitration T which are drafted by committees of
senior arbitrators and counsel T reflect the systemic bias of the international
arbitration system in favour of trade usages. In a 2000 survey, Drahozal
found that thirty-two of the forty-four largest commercial arbitration
institutions require arbitrators to take trade usages into account, regardless
of the applicable law.194 Article 21 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration is typical.
JKhKg .,1(OVU+ *Pp* *PU .p,*OU+ “+PpLL oU R,UU” *1 pQ,UU 12 *PU p..LOWpoLU ,)LU+
1R Lpmf p2V *Pp* O2 *PU po+U2WU 1R +)WP p2 pQ,UU4U2*f *PU *,Oo)2pL “+PpLL p..Lj
the r)LU+ 1R Lpm mPOWP O* VU*U,4O2U+ *1 oU p..,1.,Op*Ud” 195 Article 21(2) then
.,1(OVU+ *Pp* *PU *,Oo)2pL “+PpLL *pMU pWW1)2* 1R *PU .,1(O+O12+ 1R *PU
contract . . d p2V 1R p2j ,ULU(p2* *,pVU )+pQU+d”196 Thus, the ICC Rules
require tribunals to apply the governing rules of law, the contract, and trade
190. A.H. HERMANN, J UDGES, LAW, AND BUSINESSMEN 221 (1983).
191. Collins, supra note 44, at 187.
192. On the affinity of international arbitrators for trade usages, see KARTON, supra note
79, at 112-14. Cremades makes a similar observationB “[i]nternational arbitrators have always
been closer, and thus more familiar with, the usages and practices of international commercial
trade than local judges.” Bernardo M. Cremades, Overcoming the Clash of Legal Cultures:
The Role of Interactive Arbitration, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 167 (Stefan N. Frommel & Barry A.K. Rider, eds., 1999).
193. On the place of trade usages in transnational contract law generally, see supra Section
IV.B.2.
194. Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International
Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT:L L. 79, 112 (2000).
195. Int:l Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules, Art. 21(1) (effective as of Mar. 1,
2017), available at https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/rules-of-arbitra
tion/ [https://perma.cc/QJ9E-VC2R].
196. Id. at Art. 21(2).

188

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21:1

usages as hierarchically equal sources of the legal rights and obligations of
the parties.
Similar language appears in modern national arbitration legislation,
reflecting the increasing prominence of trade usages in national law
described above.197 Prior to 1985, references to trade usages in national
arbitration statutes were rare.198 However, most statutes enacted or amended
since 1985 contain provisions requiring arbitrators to take trade usages into
account.199 These changes are partly motivated by a neoliberal trust in
private ordering by commercial communities, and partly by inter-state
competition to attract arbitration business. 200
]2 +P1,*f p,oO*,p*1,+: OVU2*OROWp*O12 mO*P o)+O2U++ p**O*)VU+ p2V O2*U,U+*+
means that trade usages have played and will continue play a prominent role
in international arbitral decision-making, regardless of the applicable law.
Since determination according to trade usages is inherently more industryparticularized than decision according to broadly-applicable contract law
principles, any increase in the share of cross-border commercial disputes
resolved by arbitration is likely to lead to greater sectoral fragmentation.
In some sectors where arbitration is particularly popular, sectoral
fragmentation has already arrived. For example, ex aequo et bono
determination is common in contract disputes administered by the Court of
A,oO*,p*O12 R1, >.1,* h“!A>”gf pL*P1)QP O* O+ ,pre in all other commercial
sectors.201 Over time, the decisions of CAS tribunals have developed into a
coherent (albeit not comprehensive) lex sportiva, despite the lack of any
doctrine of binding precedent and despite the broad discretion granted to
tribunals by ex aequo et bono determination. 202
197. See supra Section IV.B.2.
198. Drahozal, supra note 194, at 118.
199. English translations of these statutes are collected in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Jan Paulsson ed., 2010). This trend is traceable in part to the
enactment since 1985 of over seventy statutes based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, which
includes a provision to this effect, art. 28(4).
200. On competition between states for arbitration business, see KARTON, supra note 79,
at 68-71. Competition for disputes exists in other areas as well. See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain
& Stephen Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and
Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465 (2015) (describing competition among U.S. states to attract
merger litigation to their courts); LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION
FOR BIG C ASES IS CORRUPTING THE B ANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005) (describing competition
among U.S. states to attract bankruptcy litigation).
201. Ex aequo et bono, also referred to as amiable composition (the terms are synonymous
as generally construed), means that the tribunal may decide purely on its sense of fairness,
without reliance on any legal rules. On the rarity of amiable composition, see KARTON, supra
note 79, at 152-53.
202. See, e.g., LEX SPORTIVA: WHAT IS SPORTS LAW? (Robert C. R. Siekman & Janwillem
Soek eds., 2012) (discussing whether international sports law is a separate discipline);
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Similarly, it is now common to see references to a lex petrolea in
arbitrations relating to the oil and gas industry. The concept was proposed
some time ago, 203 but has recently attracted greater attention among both
commentators and practitioners, especially in investor-state arbitrations.204
Like the lex sportiva, the lex petrolea is almost entirely an arbitral
phenomenon; it has been developed by arbitrators, and international arbitral
pmp,V+ p,U O*+ .,O4p,j “+1),WU 4p*U,OpLd”205
As with all areas of adjudication, normative fragmentation leads in turn
to demands for greater formal or informal specialization by arbitrators and
counsel.206 Arbitrators increasingly identify (that is, market) themselves not
oj Uk.U,*O+U O2 “O2*U,2p*O12pL p,oO*,p*O12 Lpm” QU2U,pLLjf o)* O2 VO+.)*U+
arising from particular industries. Arbitral institutions and other industry
groups have furthered this trend, in large part by promulgating lists of
arbitrators with verified expertise in particular sectors. For example, the
International Center for Dispute Resolution of the American Arbitration
A++1WOp*O12 .)oLO+PU+ p2 “a2U,Qj A,oO*,p*1,+ ZO+*f” mPOWP W12*pO2+ *PU
names of arbitrators from around the world who hold relevant qualifications
and experience for managing disputes in the energy sector. 207 The Institute
for Energy Law recently published its own list of energy arbitrators; 208
nominees must complete a questionnaire about their arbitration and energy
Michael Beloff, The Specificity of Sport%Rhetoric or Reality?, 2012, 4 INT:L SPORTS L. REV.
97 (2012) (explaining the development of consistent rules through accretion of arbitral
precedents); Lorenzo Casini, The Making of a Lex Sportiva by the Court of Arbitration for
Sport, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1317 (2011) (explaining that the lex sportiva is sometimes referred to
as the lex ludica, or law of games).
203. It was first raised by the government of Kuwait in the AMINOIL arbitration.
Government of the State of Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Co. (AMINOIL), Award of
May 24, 1982, IX YBK. COMM. ARB. 71 (1984), Para 155.
204. See, e.g., Carmen Otero Garcia-Castrillon, Reflections on the law applicable to
international oil contracts, 6(2) J. WORLD ENERGY LAW & BUS. 129 (2013) (discussing the
formation of the legal regime surrounding oil contracts); Mary B. Ayad, Harmonization of
Custom, General Principles of Law, and Islamic Law in Oil Concessions, 29(5) J. INT:L ARB.
477 (2012) (describing the legal principles incorporated into contracts for oil exploration in
the Middle East); Kim Talus et al, Lex petrolea and the internationalization of petroleum
agreements: focus on Host Government Contracts 5(3) J. WORLD ENERGY LAW & BUS. 181
(2012) (explaining the relationship between lex petrolea and international petroleum
agreements); Childs, supra note 135, at 214 (summarizing the major arbitral rulings regarding
oil and gas contracts).
205. Bishop, supra note 135, at 1133.
206. Zumbansen, supra note 12, at 799.
207. Energy Arbitrators List Home Page, http://energyarbitratorslist.icdr.org/ [https://per
ma.cc/C9CF-RYFU ] (last visited Nov. 23, 2018).
208. IEL Energy Arbitrators List, The Center for American and International Law, http://
www.cailaw.org/institute-for-energy-law/arbitrator-search.html?viewAll=1#search-top
[https://perma.cc/RQ7L-KABM] (last visited Nov. 23, 2018).
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industry experience and knowledge to be listed.209 Some major industryspecialist international arbitral institutions already exist, such as the longstanding London Maritime Arbitration Association, the well-established
Court of Arbitration for Sport, and the recently-founded PRIME Finance; 210
additional institutions of this kind are likely to be established, just as
specialist courts and judicial lists have multiplied in recent years.211
V. CONCLUSION: POLITICAL AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF
SECTORALLY FRAGMENTED CONTRACT LAW
The trends and influences described above suggest that transnational
contract law will trend increasingly away from differentiation across national
borders and toward differentiation along industry sectors. The widespread
acceptance of contract law principles that favour commercial context, trade
usages, and good faith will abet industry particularism, and distinct bodies
of law will continue to coalesce that govern different types of commercial
relationships. These rules may have their origin in contractual and other
private governance mechanisms, but will be adopted into formal contract law
T domestic and transnational T through rulemaking or adjudicative
processes. Institutions will be established or will change to cope with and
cater to this normative fragmentation, as will the international commercial
bar, leading to institutional fragmentation. In short, transnational contract
law will increasingly exhibit sectoral fragmentation, both normatively and
institutionally.
The primary driver of sectoral fragmentation is private enterprise acting
through contractual governance and private rulemaking bodies. Businesses
tend to prefer particularist rules because such rules are likely be predictable,
economically efficient, and commercially sensible to members of a given
209. Arbitrator Qualification Criteria, The Center for American and International Law, h
ttp://www.cailaw.org/media/files/IEL/ArbitratorList/arbitrator-qualifications.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2RT-GERA] (last visited Nov. 23, 2018).
210. Prime Financed Disputes About Us Page, https://primefinancedisputes.org/page/ab
out-us [https://perma.cc/WRM3-5NAB] (last visited Nov. 23, 2018). The name PRIME
Finance was chosen specifically to advertise the industry-specific expertise of its arbitrators;
it stands for “Panel of Recognised International Market Experts in Finance”.
211. Two prominent examples of recently-established specialist courts on the international
stage are the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts (https://www.difccourts.ae/aboutcourts/ [https://perma.cc/8TYB-MP9Z]) and the Singapore International Commercial Court.
See Singapore International Court Committee, Report of the Singapore International
Commercial Court Committee, (2013),
https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/Annex%20A%20%20SICC%20Committee%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/926K-LK64] (providing the
report of the committee establishing the court).
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industry. Generation of particularist rules may also provide opportunities for
businesses to avoid regulations that increase costs or decrease contractual
autonomy.
One would therefore expect contract law particularism to be most
advanced in areas where private governance is strongest: highly globalized
industries in which a fairly small and homogeneous group of market
participants repeatedly transact with each other on the basis of variations on
standard form contracts and frequently resort to arbitration to resolve
disputes.212 Indeed, this is exactly what has occurred, as with the oil and gas
industry (lex petrolea), and with certain internationally popular sports such
as soccer, ice hockey, and the Olympic disciplines (lex sportiva). Some other
commercial sectors that share these characteristics long ago developed their
own fragmented bodies of substantive law and corresponding institutions.
The best example is shipping, which has for centuries been a globalized
industry with a homogeneous group of market participants who contracted
repeatedly with each other using established forms and resorting frequently
to arbitration in the case of disputes. 213
These phenomena are not entirely unprecedented, but to find precedents
we may have to reach far back in (at least Western) history, to an era when
the various trade guildsTstonemasons, carpenters, shippers, and the likeT
observed relatively uniform Europe-wide rules outside of state laws and
particular to their crafts, rules that were enforced and developed by private
specialist tribunals that met at trade fairs. 214 This system arose in the Middle
212. In industries where there is one dominant standard form or a very small number of
dominant forms, such as with the FIDIC forms in the construction industry, there is less
development of particularist legal doctrines than in industries without a dominant form
contract. Near-complete particularization will have been achieved through private contracting
alone, so there will be less pressure for particularistic legal rules to develop through legislation
or case law.
213. Of course, the treatment of maritime disputes T commercial or otherwise T as
governed by a distinct body of law has a much longer history, a fact that aided in the
development of distinct rules and institutions for commercial disputes that involved shipping.
214. See Emily Kadens, Order within Law, Variety within Custom: The Character of the
Medieval Merchant Law, 5 CHI. J. INT:L L. 39-66 (2004) (discussing the laws dealing with
merchant customs and practices dating back to the Middle Ages); LEX MERCATORIA AND
LEGAL PLURALISM : A LATE THIRTEENTH-CENTURY TREATISE AND ITS AFTERLIFE (Mary
Elizabeth Basile et al. eds., 1998) (describing the legal framework of the Law Merchant in
England under King Edward); Charles Kerr, The Origin and Development of the Law
Merchant, 15 VA. L. REV. 350 (1928-1929) (tracing the Law Merchant back to ancient times);
John H. Baker, The Law Merchant and the Common Law, 38 CAMB. L. J. 295, 299 (1979)
(collecting references to the Law Merchant in medieval English texts). Modern interest in the
medieval lex mercatoria seems to originate with WYNDHAM ANTSIS BEWES, THE ROMANCE
OF THE L AW MERCHANT: BEING AN INTRODUCTION TO THE S TUDY OF INTERNATIONAL AND
COMMERCIAL LAW WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF THE COMMERCE AND FAIRS OF THE MIDDLE AGES
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Ages and persisted, to some extent, until the consolidation of modern
centralized states in the 18th century. 215 The history is contested, and I do
not intend to wade into the debatU 12 *PU Uk*U2* *1 mPOWP *PU “4UVOU(pL lex
#7r".tor3.” constituted a coherent legal system. 216 However, even if it is
only partly accurate, consideration of this history offers a tantalizing
prospect: perhaps, whenever states either cannot or will not adopt and
enforce commercially reasonable rules of general application, business
organizations fill the gap. If this is correct, then any decline of nation-states
as the sole loci of legal orders will inevitably yield differentiation along other
boundariesTsectoral boundaries, in the case of contract law. The statecentric era that began with the Peace of Westphalia may be merely an
extended interlude, and the world now be returning to pre-modern structures.
***
This concluding section reviews the positive and negative
consequences of sectoral fragmentation. The analysis is not comprehensive
and is intended to serve only as a broad overview of the kinds of
consequences one might expect from sectoral fragmentation. To a large
extent, the phenomena described in this Article are self-perpetuating, and
would be difficult if not impossible to reverse. Accordingly, the main goal
of this Article has been to understand sectoral fragmentation, rather than to
give it a thumbs up or thumbs down.
However, before listing the consequences of sectoral fragmentation, it
is worth noting that the beneficial consequences accrue largely to market
participants, while the detriments are more broadly distributed across
society. In other words, sectoral fragmentation of law leads to greater
freedom and efficiencies for the commercial sector (which may benefit
society as a whole), but also imposes negative externalities on those who are
(1923).
215. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND v. I, 75, 264
(1769) (stating that “a particular system of customs . . . called the custom of merchants, or lex
mercatoria . . . is allowed for the benefit of trade, to be of the utmost validity in all commercial
transactions . . . .” because, “as these are transactions carried on between subjects of
independent states, the municipal laws of one will not be regarded by the other. For which
reason the affairs of commerce are regulated by . . . the law merchant or lex mercatoria, which
all nations agree in and take notice of.”).
216. Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many Lives & And Faces & of Lex Mercatoria: History as
Genealogy in International Business Law, 71, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 178 (2008);
Albrecht Cordes, The Search for a Medieval Lex Mercatoria, 5 OX. U. COMP. L. FORUM
(2003), http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/the-search-for-a-medieval-lex-mercatoria/ [https://perma.cc/
2R4K-Z6CU]; Nicholas H. D. Foster, Foundation Myth as legal formant: The medieval Law
Merchant and the new Lex Mercatoria, FORUM HISTORIAE IURIS (18. Mar. 2005), http://www.
forhistiur.de/2005-03-foster/ [https://perma.cc/U6AV-4GF7].
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subject to the law without having had a role in generating it, in particular
consumers and workers.
To an extent, sectoral fragmentation is simply evidence of the
maturation of transnational contract law, as the law evolves and increasingly
reflects the complexity of the pluralistic, polycentric society it shapes and is
shaped by. Such maturation carries significant benefits, both for the
commercial parties governed by particularized legal regimes and for society
generally.
First, particularist laws are more predictable and lead to greater
efficiency.217 Since the market is the primary social institution implicated by
contract law, this should mean more efficient markets. A contract law that
reinforces the prevailing practices of commercial parties, holding to account
parties that deviate from those standards, will more accurately align the
incentives of transacting parties with economically efficient outcomes.
Since no single approach is likely to be efficient for all types of transactions
and all industry sectors, particularized contract law reduces transaction
costs.218 This should, in turn, encourage both a greater volume of trade and
a broader distribution of the benefits of trade through a lowering of barriers
to entry. A sectorally fragmented law presided over by specialists is also
more likely to keep pace with fast-changing business dynamics. There is
some empirical evidence for these propositions, in the form of studies of
specialist business courts that have been established in some U.S. states. 219
>UW12Vf oUO2Q N)VQUV pWW1,VO2Q *1 *PU +*p2Vp,V+ 1R 12U:+ 1m2
community is, in a real way, more fair than being judged according to blanket
standards.220 =PU pW*)pL .UU, Q,1). 1R *1Vpj:+ Lp,QU W144U,WOpL U2*U,.,O+U+

217. The same argument has been made with respect to the emergence of specialized subdisciplines of public international lawB “Law making and law enforcement by specialized
organizations are likely to lead to better law. Regulatory competition may increase efficiency
and provide a laboratory for the development of new legal instruments.” Joost Pauwelyn,
Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected
Islands, 25 MICH. J. INT:L L. 903, 904 (2004).
218. No single approach is likely to be efficient for all types of transactions and all sectors.
See Aditi Bagchi, The Political Economy of Regulating Contract, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 687
(2014) (emphasizing that each regime:s choice to use either mandatory ex ante or default ex
post rules to regulate contracts is a function of the political and economic factors present in
its transactional environment).
219. See John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1915, 1976-79 (2012) (suggesting that specialized business courts render more accurate
and satisfying judgments than generalist courts).
220. An analogy might be to medical malpractice law, where specialists are judged
according to the standard of conduct considered reasonable for members of their specialty, or
to obscenity prosecutions, where decency is judged according to the standards of the
community where the allegedly indecent acts or statements were made.
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is the international community of businesses in the same industry, not other
businesses from their home states. 221 It is therefore more fair (or at least will
be perceived to be more fair) to apply to members of a given industry
particularized rules that align with the standard practices of that industry,
especially when those rules can be more accurately applied to deliver relief
from hardship in exceptional cases. Similarly, it would be more just to apply
a common set of transnational rules than to apply any one national law to a
transnational community.
Third, particularized law can improve buy-O2 oj ,UV)WO2Q .p,*OU+:
resentment at rules that were designed to cover a wide range of
circumstances, or which evolved in a market context that no longer exists,
and which therefore lead to unreasonable results in particular circumstances.
This in turn can increase the confidence of commercial parties in the legal
system and promote the rule of law.
Fourth, sectoral fragmentation may make more sense than the
alternative, which is not true globalism but state fragmentation. Since the
rise of nation-states, contract law has been fragmented along state
boundaries, but history shows that this is not a necessary or necessarily
beneficial state of affairs. Shifting to sectoral boundaries would render
differences between national laws irrelevant. This would reduce incentives
for forum shopping and for a regulatory race to the bottom, which would
benefit consumers, employees, and civil society generally.
Despite these benefits, sectoral fragmentation may in the end be more
threat than opportunity. It poses risks both for the legal system generally and
for the commercial parties that use it. Since certain categories of commercial
parties may be harmed by sectoral fragmentation, it should not be considered
as simply a consequence of raw corporate power wielded at the expense of
the state.
First, there are the well-known drawbacks to specialization, especially
in the context of adjudication. 222 As the old joke has it, a specialist is
221. Similarly, the lawyers who work on high-stakes commercial disputes, whether
through litigation, arbitration or some other form of ADR, have more in common with each
other than with the body of legal practitioners in any one jurisdiction. See ROGER
COTTERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 186 (2d ed. 1992) (arguing that “it
[is] difficult to see any significant bonds of common experience and interest” between “the
high prestige corporation lawyer and the sole practitioner in a large American urban centre”);
see also KARTON, supra note 79, at 23 (claiming that practitioners of international arbitration
have unique characteristics for which they should be classified as an independent international
community, as opposed to a subset of the legal community of a particular country).
222. On the pros and cons of specialist courts in general, see, e.g., Nuno Garoupa et al.,
Assessing the Argument for Specialized Courts: Evidence from Family Courts in Spain 24(1)
INT: L J. L. POL:Y & FAM. 54 (2010) (finding little evidence that specialized courts are capable
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+14U12U mP1 “M21m+ 41,U p2V 41,U po1)* LU++ p2V LU++d” >.UWOpLOip*O12
carries with it the risk of tunnel vision. Opportunities for cross-fertilization
from other fields of law will be lost, even where conglomerates operate
across industry sectors. The development of the law can stagnate, especially
where cases are not accorded precedential value (as in arbitration) or where
adjudicators do not draw on precedents established in cases involving
different industry sectors.223 Rule-makers and adjudicators who preside only
over disputes arising from a single industry can lose touch with the
commonalities among industries and the broad principles that should apply
to all transactions. The result may be the proliferation of increasingly
complex sets of esoteric rules that make sense only to insiders. 224
The same can occur to the legal practitioners who work in the area, in
particular the international arbitration bar: the bar and judiciary may splinter
into a hermetic castes, each with its own distinct values, jargons, and
loyalties, unable to understand or empathize with the others. 225 As Teubner
m,O*U+f “rOq* O+ 21 41,U *PU R,pQ4U2*p*O12 1R )2O(U,+pL N)+*OWU O2 VORRU,U2*
national laws that haunts us, but the fragmentation of universal rationality
O2*1 p VO+*),oO2Q 4)L*O.LOWO*j 1R VO+W1),+U+d” 226 In this context, it is precisely
the technical expertise of specialists that is the problem. For example,
Ginsburg and Wright argue (in the context of assessing proposals for
specialist antitrust courts), that:
Whereas the specialist brings to the court a depth of knowledge about
the subject that enables the judge immediately to place a new issue in its
evolutionary context . . . generalists by definition have a breadth of
of concluding litigation faster than general courts); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers
for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67 (1995) (evaluating the efficacy of specialized courts,
their effect on the quality of decisions, whether the negativity surrounding them is warranted,
and a proposed future structure). On specialist international commercial courts, see, e.g.,
Denise H. Wong, The Rise of the International Commercial Court: What Is It and Will It
Work?, 33(2) CIV. JUST. Q. 205 (2014) (explaining the characteristics of the Singapore
International Commercial Court, how it came into existence, and the challenges that it will
face).
223. In a much-discussed 2016 speech, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales
lamented that diversion of commercial cases from litigation to arbitration was reducing
opportunities for the courts to develop and explain English commercial law. Lord Thomas of
Cwmgiedd, Lord C.J. of Eng. and Wales, Developing Commercial Law through the Courts:
Rebalancing the Relationship between the Courts and Arbitration (Mar. 9, 2016).
224. Cf. Zumbansen, supra note 109, at 320-21 (“As . . . functionally differentiated
problem areas and spheres of human and institutional conduct evolve in response to a
combination of external impulses and their own particular logic, the law governing these
constellations becomes deeply entwined in these complex, layered constitutions.”).
225. Admittedly, there is much more commonality of values in the commercial arena than
in other areas of law, at least among Western legal systems.
226. Teubner, supra note 21, at 901.
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experience upon which to draw . . . .
. . . [E]xposure to other areas of the law may give the generalist
insights unavailable to a specialist but nonetheless helpful in
penetrating an argument or seeing an issue in a broader context,
perhaps one that implicates limitations upon government
institutions . . . . Thus, replacing a generalist court with a
specialized court may entail trading a lower rate of error for a
higher degree of bias . . . .227
Second, an overly particularized contract law will interfere with
national and international efforts to regulate private activity in order to
advance the public good T which, after all, is the purpose of contract law.
This interference occurs in both rule-making and rule-applying processes.
When governance shifts from public to private, stakeholders other than
corporations (such as consumers, environmental groups, and civil society
organizations) lose opportunities to exercise discursive power.
At the same time, fragmentation increases the logistical costs and
difficulties of regulation, and makes it harder for the public sector to match
*PU .,O(p*U +UW*1,:+ Uk.U,*O+Ud >UW*1,pL R,pQ4U2*p*O12 ,UW12WU.*)pLOiU+ *PU
relevant authority as technical rather than legal, even in legal contexts, which
hinders the capacity of the state to formulate, administer, and apply the law.
Since most (or all) states are unable to match the private sector for technical
sophistication, structural fragmentation strengthens private governance at
the expense of public governance by making states less competent to
regulate. Any such weakening of state governance capacity will, in turn,
lead to greater calls for privately-generated rules and private, specialized
regulation, yielding further structural fragmentation.
Establishing specialized public regulatory and adjudicative bodies to
cope with sectorally fragmented law will not necessarily protect the public
interest, since specialized adjudicative bodies are particularly subject to
systemic biases. Tribunals that adjudicate only a narrow category of disputes
will have neither the capacity nor the incentive to ensure that the rulings they
issue in individual cases align with the interests of a broad range of
stakeholders.
Arbitral tribunals are particularly susceptible to issuing rulings that
make internal sense Tthey achieve commercially reasonable results
between the parties T but do not take into account the public good. Indeed,
many would argue that it is simply not the role of private arbitrators to
account for the public good, or to uphold the law in a general sense. But
227. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Courts: Specialists versus
Generalists, 36 FORDHAM INT:L L.J. 788, 803-04 (2013).
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whether the specialized adjudicators are privately selected on an ad hoc basis
or publicly employed with life tenure, only individuals with the requisite
expertise will be appointed. Where the adjudicative institutions are
fragmented by industry sector, work in or with the corporations operating
that sector will be the only way to gain such expertise.
Even outsiders who come to the sector later in their careers may come
to share the systemic biases of their institutions. Through continued
exposure to repeat players (such as specialist counsel), adjudicators come to
trust them and to adopt their perspectives. 228 Such a bias will not necessarily
be anti-regulation or anti-public interest, but commercial parties will likely
play an outsized role, either indirectly by influencing the composition of the
specialist bar or directly by appointing arbitrators congenial to corporate
interests.
Third, the opacity of fragmented law creates barriers to entry. New
market entrants would be foolish to commence operations without extensive
consultation with specialists, especially since a law that prioritizes trade
usages may bind entrants to observe industry practices with which they are
unfamiliar and which they may not be able to identify by consulting publiclyavailable materials. The winners in such a situation are the established
market actors (and, as always, the lawyers), stifling disruptive innovation
and encouraging oligopolies. One of the main benefits of enforcing trade
usages is that usages evolve immediately along with commercial practice, so
that the outcomes can shift with changing business practices, faster than
legislation or even case law can follow. But if the standard practices of the
O2W)4oU2*+ oUW14U “,1*U p2V U2W,)+*UV” T standardized terms that are
continually adopted without any particular meaning attached to them by the
parties to individual contracts 229 T or become codified through private or
public rulemaking processes, it may be more difficult to adjust these rules or
standards along with the changing commercial context.
Moreover, established industry players will have participated in trade
association or public rulemaking activities, and so will have had an
opportunity unavailable to new entrants to shape the rules that govern their
industry. It would be surprising if incumbents did not take advantage of this
opportunity to try to enact rules that might protect them from competitionT
to exercise the greater discursive power that a sectorally fragmented legal
environment provides to them in order to codify their way of doing things as
the way of doing things. This problem is exacerbated if, as Bernstein has

228. Id. at 802-03.
229. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in
Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 8-15 (2017).

198

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21:1

shown in a more limited context, usages are typically proven by the
testimony of employees rather than by statistical data or expert witnesses. 230
The repeat players thus have the opportunity to create the data upon which
courts will later rely. 231
Relatedly, fragmented contract law creates barriers to understanding of
the law for industry outsiders T whether they are new entrants to the
industry, government regulators or judges, generalist lawyers, or other
stakeholders such as customers and employees. 232 If the outcomes in the
leading cases can be understood only by those who have knowledge of both
the relevant statutes and precedents and the relevant industry standards, it
becomes more difficult for non-specialists to access the law. 233 Obscurity of
the law harms its popular legitimacy and hinders access to justice. In
international commercial arbitration, the fact that most arbitral awards are
W12ROVU2*OpL pL,UpVj .,O(OLUQU+ *PU “O2+OVU,” Lpm RO,4+ *Pp* Pp(U Uk*U2+O(U O2house records of arbitral awards, and can therefore make more informed
choices about which arbitrators to appoint and how to frame their arguments.
Fragmentation of contract law would only exacerbate the inequality of arms
between large firms with established international arbitration practice groups
and smaller firms, especially those from developing states.
Fourth, and possibly of greatest concern, is the risk that common
standards will become degraded to the point that the rule of law itself is
impaired. To an extent, this concern is simply a variation on the familiar
debate between rules and standards, and is neither surprising nor
dangerous.234 That is, the more an area of the law is dominated by specific
rules rather than general standards, the more open it is to charges that the
forest has been lost for the trees. Nevertheless, normative and institutional
230. Bernstein, supra, note 126, at 67.
231. Id.
232. Cf. Helge Dedek & Alexandra Carbone, Canadian Report, 20 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 81,
88 (2012) (“Complexity of transnational sources has another, one might say, less lofty aspect
T the application of law is simply made technically more difficult by the proliferation of
transnational law and transnational legal <sources:, particularly the multiplicity of
international instruments.”).
233. My own experience in teaching contract and commercial law reinforces this point.
Cases that turn on trade usages are difficult to teach, and the judgments are often highly
unsatisfying to students. In my role as an educator, the best I can do is expose students to the
various ways in which trade usages matter, and exhort them never to forget the potentially
decisive character of usages when, in their careers after they graduate, they draft contracts or
litigate commercial disputes.
234. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 547 (2003) (discussing how default rules and standards in contract
law should be drafted in order to avoid the application of inefficient and irrelevant default
provisions).
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division of the degree described in this Article, along with the associated
shift in regulatory power from the public to private spheres, goes beyond
simply rules versus standards. Sectoral fragmentatio2 4pj O2 RpW* “*,p2+R1,4
the legal regime into an assemblage of islands of dispute resolution, each
with its distinct professional, ideological, and institutional allegiances, and
none (or very few) concerned with upholding the premise of an equal and
gene,pL ,)LU 1R Lpmd” 235 This is the fear at the heart of arguments that the
unity and systematicity of the law must be preserved. 236 The rule of law is
ultimately meaningless if similarly positioned members of a community are
not governed by the same standards. 237 If fragmentation continues to
extremes, we may give up the rule of law for a law of rules.

235. Ori Aronson, Out of Many: Military Commissions, Religious Tribunals, and the
Democratic Virtues of Court Specialization, 51 VA. J. INT:L L. 231, 259 (2011).
236. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (discussing different aspects of the
fragmentation of international law).
237. This concern reflects an arguably outdated conception of the unity of private law.
Smits observes, “Except for systematic purity, such consistency serves the important goal of
establishing equality before the law (and thereby legal certainty): only if rules and principles
are applied in a uniform way, similar cases can be treated alike. . . . Leaving aside the
accuracy of this past view, it is abundantly clear that this view no longer represents presentday private law.” Smits, supra note 29, at 155-56.

